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Changing the Culture and Redefining the Detroit Symphony Orchestra



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Changing the Culture and Redefining the Detroit Symphony Orchestra

In the last decade, the Detroit Symphony Orchestra has changed the way it does business. The DSO's creative methods of thinking, planning, and communicating collectively as an organization have fostered an entirely new leadership dynamic that thrives amidst cross-constituent work. This case study explores the DSO's organizational decision-making relative to financial planning, organizational planning, community relationships, and programming initiatives. The case invites learners to assess the original strategic planning document, Blueprint 2023, and create plans for Blueprint 2.0 that will continue to guide the DSO's planning and program growth relative to financial considerations.



This case study was prepared by Rachel Roberts, Associate Professor of Music Leadership and Graduate Degree Program Director at the Eastman School of Music. **The Eastman Case Studies** are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements or sources of primary data nor are they to serve as illustrations of effective or ineffective leadership or decision making. This case study is a collaboration of the League of American Orchestras and the Eastman School of Music.



Building a Legacy for the Future

Representing one of Detroit's cultural treasures, the Detroit Symphony Orchestra has a history filled with revivals and triumphs over obstacles. Under conductor Rudolph Speil, the DSO gave its first performance

on December 19, 1887, at the Detroit Opera House. By 1910, it had ceased operations. Four years later, ten young Detroit women organized quickly to reassemble the orchestra. Each woman contributed \$100 and pledged to find 100 additional subscribers who would donate \$10 to

support the ensemble. Hiring 27-year-old Boston church organist Weston Gales, the reconstituted DSO held its first concert on February 26, 1914, again at the Detroit Opera House.

When Weston Gales departed his post at the DSO in 1917, he was succeeded by famed Russian pianist Ossip Gabrilowitsch, who brought instant credibility to the DSO due in part to his friendships with Gustav Mahler and Sergei Rachmaninoff and as the son-in-law of famed American writer Mark Twain. When the Detroit Symphony Society offered Gabrilowitsch an extension of his contract, he agreed only on the condition that a concert hall worthy of the orchestra be built. The Society purchased Detroit's Westminster Presbyterian Church on April 22, 1919, and shortly thereafter, the old church was gone except for the foundation. Seating an audience of 2,200, the city's new Orchestra Hall was built in less than five months. For the next twenty years, Orchestra Hall, the DSO, and Gabrilowitsch performed throughout an artistic golden era.

The orchestra collaborated with spectacular guest artists during this time while paving a path for innovative ways to share its music with audiences around the globe. With pianist Artur Schnabel, the DSO performed in the world's first symphonic radio

broadcast on local WWJ-AM. 1928 saw both the DSO's first Carnegie Hall performance and the production of the orchestra's first recording. Between 1934 and 1942, the DSO performed for millions on the Ford Symphony Hour national radio show, as the country's first official radio broadcast orchestra.

Following Gabrilowitsch's premature death in 1936, wracked by the Great Depression, and burdened with debt, the orchestra disbanded twice and moved from Orchestra Hall to three different venues in Detroit. In 1951, Detroit's leading corporations each pledged \$10,000 for the DSO to resume operations in celebration of the city's 250th anniversary. A move to the Ford Auditorium in 1956 provided a home for the next 33 years, under Music Directors Paul Paray, Antal Dorati, and others. The orchestra had established a second golden era as one of the country's most recorded orchestras, issuing 70 albums in just 11 years.

After the DSO's move to other locations, Orchestra Hall sat empty for two years until December 26, 1941, when it reopened as Paradise Theater. The name was derived from Paradise Valley, an area just east of Woodward Avenue, which served as home to Detroit's African American community, including the principal black entertainment district. Offering the best in jazz, bebop, and blues to all audiences, Paradise Theater was prominently featured in yet another golden era of Detroit's music scene. Hosting the most renowned jazz musicians of the day including Louis Armstrong, Ella Fitzgerald, Billie Holiday, Count Basie, and Duke Ellington, the Paradise Theater closed in 1951, a result of the declining big band era.

By 1970, Orchestra Hall fell into disrepair once Paradise Theater closed. After rumors that the hall would be demolished and replaced with a fast-food chain, a group that included then-principal bassoonist Paul Ganson rallied Detroit citizens through marches and sidewalk benefit performances to save the venue from demolition. Following 20 years of restoration, \$6.8

The Detroit Symphony Orchestra has a history filled with revivals and triumphs over obstacles.

million in expenses, and thousands of donated hours, Orchestra Hall re-opened. Celebrated as an acoustical gem among performance halls worldwide, the DSO's 1989 return to Orchestra Hall was welcomed with a sold-out crowd. In 1990, Estonian conductor Neeme Järvi began a fifteen-year tenure as music director of the DSO, leading the ensemble to garner worldwide acclaim through multiple European and Asian tours and the release of more than 40 recordings.

The tenacity of the orchestra throughout its first century built a foundation upon which the DSO could continue to thrive. In the face of every physical move, Orchestra Hall continued to stand on Woodward Avenue, known as "Detroit's Main Street," and remains a civic asset worthy of preservation. Amid multiple stops and starts, the determination of the DSO to continue performing clearly exhibits the courage and vision of leaders both within the organization and throughout the city of Detroit to ensure the organization's artistic contributions to the broader community. Consonant with its mission, the orchestra remains "a leader in the world of classical music, embrac[ing] and inspir[ing] individuals, families, and communities through unsurpassed musical experiences." With its vision of being "an inclusive and culturally relevant community where all people can experience their world through music," the DSO has pioneered the way from live radio broadcasts to its award-winning discography. The artistic quality and output of the DSO has never been in question.

The Perfect Storm ... and the Perfect Opportunity

Anne Parsons arrived as the DSO's President in 2004, having held leadership positions with the NY City Ballet, Hollywood Bowl, Boston Symphony Orchestra, and the National Symphony. She led the search that named Leonard Slatkin as music director in 2008, which was a signifying moment for the DSO to creatively redefine itself. His arrival coincided with two related and unforeseen challenges for the orchestra: the global economic recession and Detroit's own financial

depression. By 2009, a recovery was underway in the United States thanks to bank bailouts and a stabilization of the housing market. And though stocks were rising again on Wall Street, unemployment was still prevalent across the country. Some estimates suggested a 9.8% unemployment rate, while broader projections of joblessness put the total figure closer to 17%.¹ The recession had taken a large toll, decimating jobs, savings accounts, retirement and pension accounts, and healthcare benefits; it caused thousands of home foreclosures and widened the ever-increasing gap between socio-economic classes. While the recession impacted the entire country, it hit Detroit particularly hard. Once named one of the wealthiest American cities and boasting nearly two million residents in the 1950s, Detroit saw its population cut to almost one-third of this size.² The Motor City had become one of the poorest major cities in the United States.³

Detroit went from being one of the wealthiest American cities in the 1950s with almost two million residents to one of the poorest, losing two-thirds of its population.

Because Detroit's local economy was already stressed before the global economy declined, the city experienced a particularly destructive collapse. Despite being the birthplace of the American car industry, Detroit automakers General Motors and Chrysler were experiencing ballooning deficits. Both filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2009, and the local workforce was negatively impacted by liquidated and consolidated product lines. Detroit's landscape saw devastating abandonment. Factories and apartment buildings stood empty; rows and rows of burnt-out houses littered the neighborhoods; public transportation was curtailed; municipal streetlights

¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/01/detroit-michigan-economy-recession-unemployment>

² <http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/detroit-population/>

³ <https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/09/16/census-us-uninsured-drops-income-stagnates/32499231/>

went dark; and tall grasses, shrubs, and urban prairies sprung up where living spaces had once flourished. The economic realities of America's de-industrialization impacted every individual and every socio-economic class throughout Detroit, even bringing about the creation of an underclass.⁴

At the same time, Detroit's average home price was \$7,500, its jobless rate was an astonishing 29%, and the city itself was nearly was \$300 million in debt.⁵ That number would swell to a staggering \$18 billion by 2014,⁶ manifesting into Detroit's chapter 9 bankruptcy filing. The DSO's Woodward Avenue neighbor, the Detroit Institute of Art (DIA), was a near-casualty of the city's economic woes. Owned and operated by the City of Detroit since its inception in 1885, the DIA prepared for numerous court appearances during the economic depression in an effort to protect the integrity of its collection against the city's significant economic shortfalls. With an endowment of \$119 million and an art collection appraised at \$4.6 billion, the city viewed the DIA as a significant contributor towards paying its accumulated debts. The "Grand Bargain" in 2014 represented an independent effort that raised over \$800 million to fund the city's public workers' pensions in exchange for the DIA being turned over to an independent charitable trust for management.⁷ While cognizant of an operating structure completely separate from the city, the DIA's own independent financial managers witnessed potential warnings in achieving both their annual fund and \$400 million endowment goals, specifically from benefactors who realized their own individual economic hardships and were uncertain of their future giving commitments.

Unsurprisingly, the DSO faced its own financial challenges in this calamitous economic environment.

Seemingly overnight in 2009, the orchestra was in default on its loans; its endowment lost nearly 30% and was worth less than what was owed on the bonds. Patrons, subscribers, donors, and philanthropists were pulling back their participation and investment in the orchestra due to their own economic constraints and financial hardships. This was similar to other U.S. orchestras who also struggled with declining corporate donations and ticket sales in the wake of the financial crash. For nearly an entire year, the DSO was also unsuccessful in renegotiating its musician collective bargaining agreement. The orchestra covered its \$8.8 million loss for fiscal year 2010 with funds from its already-depleted endowment. The DSO management cut staff by one-third, instituted permanent pay cuts, and made substantial changes to staff healthcare and pension plans. Additionally, members of the union representing the DSO/Orchestra Hall stage hands and technicians agreed to pay cuts and freezes; Music Director Leonard Slatkin also agreed to two contract extensions that compensated him at rates below his original contract.

With pressure mounting from the prior year's unresolved contract renegotiation, DSO musicians officially went on strike on October 4, 2010. Within two months, the orchestra's five-bank lending consortium called for an immediate restructuring of its \$54 million loan, making an already precarious situation perilous. Reaching an agreement almost exactly six months later (April 3, 2011), the musicians settled on a three-year concessionary contract that initially reduced their compensation by 25%. Though it took an additional year, the DSO also restructured its bond debts with the banks. Doing so completely eliminated the orchestra's

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⁴ <https://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/detroits-enormous-underclass-the-problem-thats-taboo/Content?oid=5552835>

⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/01/detroit-michigan-economy-recession-unemployment>

⁶ <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-for-bankruptcy.html>

⁷ <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/arts/design/grand-bargain-saves-the-detroit-institute-of-arts.html>

unrestricted endowment, leaving very little operating cash and allowing for no borrowing capacity. The orchestra reduced its operating budget by nearly 25% to become a \$25 million organization.

CEO Anne Parsons and her team consistently led the DSO's evolution not by being complacent with the status quo, but instead by questioning what is being done and how progress is being achieved.

Aside from navigating through the significant financial headwinds, the DSO administration utilized this unplanned six-month work stoppage as the perfect opportunity to think critically and creatively about what the organization could look like when the orchestra returned to work. CEO Anne Parsons and her team consistently led the DSO's evolution not by being complacent with the status quo, but instead by questioning what is being done and how progress is being achieved. As then-

current DSO Board Chair Stanley Frankel remarked, "Anne has everything the DSO needs at this critical point in its history . . . to lead the organization toward its collective pursuit of a viable and successful future."⁸ While the uncertainty lingered of when and how the orchestra would return to work, this "found" time allowed Anne to collaborate and deliberate creatively with her colleagues on how the DSO would continue to provide for its communities.

The Next Chapter: Innovations On and Off Stage

The orchestra's three-year concessionary labor contract was ratified the day after an agreement was reached. In the six months leading up to its resolution, Vice President and General Manager Erik Rönmark had continually planned with venues and artists for the remaining 2010-2011 season, which had to be

adjusted each time a negotiation did not successfully conclude. Within 24 hours of ratification, the DSO announced the remainder of its 2010-2011 season and a day later unveiled the 2011-2012 season. The musicians returned to rehearsals the same day as the season announcement, in preparation for a weekend of free concerts. These concerts awakened a broad community of Detroit residents, many of whom had never been to Orchestra Hall. Crowds came out in full force to show their support to the orchestra, and many were turned away due to packed houses. The community was pleased to see a successful resolution to the fate of its cultural treasure, yet the news represented something greater to take pride in amid the challenges in the blue-collar Rust Belt town. The public gave the musicians a rock-star-like reception at the weekend concerts, greeting them with a five-minute standing ovation before a single note was played.

The ideas and innovations that resulted from the unexpected six-month planning period launched into action immediately. Throughout the latter part of 2010, a task force of board and staff was assembled to write a proposal detailing digital media initiatives that would further the DSO's strategic goals of gaining international recognition, cultivating new and existing audiences, and securing financial sustainability. Surveys of patrons and staff, analysis of website metrics, and scrutiny of digital and technological capabilities revealed opportunities that could provide a significantly enhanced experience at all levels. Focusing on the user experience, the task force recommended numerous advancements in the broad categories of video infrastructure and customer relationship management for implementation over a three-year period (**Appendix 1**).

Prioritizing patron engagement, the first digital initiative was *Live from Orchestra Hall* – free webcasts of the DSO's Classical Series concerts. The first worldwide broadcast was exactly one week from the contract resolution, the first concerts performed after

⁸ <https://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20110606/FREE/110609919/anne-parsons-signs-new-contract-will-remain-ceo-of-detroit-symphony>

the strike. The orchestra wanted to be universally accessible to the public, whether it was someone in the greater Detroit area who couldn't afford a ticket, someone who was intimidated to walk into Orchestra Hall, someone who wanted to "try before buying," or someone who lived halfway across the world. Launched initially in partnership with Detroit Public Television, the live broadcast's equipment, management, and production has over time moved under the DSO's management. The administration had planned and implemented investments in the "hard" technology of *Live from Orchestra Hall*, which have included upgrades to the camera quality and overall production elements. These upgrades have benefited the livestream quality. In-house video direction allows for musicians to collaborate with the video directors, who can advise how to feature certain solos or important passages that increase the overall attention to the musical and artistic details. When *Live from Orchestra Hall* launched, there were concerns throughout the organization, specifically from the musicians, that the free, livestreamed concerts would diminish ticket revenue. These concerns were alleviated as revenue has risen instead.

The remaining spring concerts also employed the new "patron-minded pricing" as a pre-launch to a full implementation of this model in the 2011-2012 season. Throughout the work stoppage, exhaustive revenue modeling and forecasting was undertaken with staff and consultants, inclusive of understanding the patron continuum between concert attendees, subscribers, and donors. Orchestras traditionally earmark income streams into separate "ticket sales" and "contributions" buckets, with strategies to grow both revenue streams as much as possible. Revenue streams are often treated equally with little thought given to how growth of one revenue bucket may impact the other. Prior to the work stoppage, the DSO regularly increased ticket prices in an effort to grow ticket revenue. And while contributions were rising, the overall number of patrons was plummeting. Topline revenue numbers looked attractive, yet the past reality

created an unstable and minimally connected base of subscribers and donors.

Using the "found" time during the orchestra work stoppage to understand the relationship between ticket sales and donations, the DSO built strategies based on a patron-centered philosophy and on considerations for creating greater audience sizes in each concert. The hall size and number of planned concerts determine the finite number of tickets that can be sold, yet programming and price points are influential in the actual sales. When reducing the number of concerts offered, the DSO changed its focus to increase overall hall capacity. This change in focus shifted to a broader perspective of building a base of potential donors. Before 2011, the DSO had anywhere from 11 to 24 pricing levels for each concert with multiple pricing schemes. Ticket prices ranged from \$19 to \$123, with the average single ticket being at \$32.66. Since 2011, the DSO simplified every classical concert to only four pricing levels and a single pricing scheme: \$15, \$25, \$50, and \$100, with a similar average single ticket price of \$32.55. With this scheme, more than half the hall is sold for \$25 or less, providing another prong of "accessibility" (along with webcasts and geography) to the DSO's classical concerts.

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A few weeks after the conclusion of the work stoppage, the DSO launched what would later become the William Davidson Neighborhood Concerts Series, enlarging its presence in communities throughout the greater Metro Detroit region. Geographically, Detroit is 144 square miles; it can fit the cities of Boston, Manhattan, and San Francisco within its city limits and still have 25 square miles to spare. Understanding and serving the Detroit community and surrounding suburbs,

were key factors in exploring the organization's next steps. Throughout the work stoppage, DSO leadership developed a market model that analyzed the key characteristics of DSO customers. The DSO asked themselves who they were currently serving and who they might be able to serve in some type of meaningful way. Examining households that had purchased Classical, Pops, DSO Presents, Jazz, and/or summer concert tickets at some point since 2006-2007, the orchestra first focused on what drove ticket buying. The DSO explored potential markets spreading in all directions around Detroit, aiming to "meet them halfway" to lessen driving time to concerts. This work was complemented by another study examining potential concert locations, venue accessibility, acoustics, and seating capacities. Together, these studies informed the locations and partners for the DSO's Neighborhood Concert Series, bringing orchestra performances to seven regional locations.

Fully launched in 2011-2012, the Neighborhood Concert Series typically presents four full-orchestra concerts in three neighborhood venues and four chamber orchestra concerts performed in four additional locations, which increase the DSO's reach and deliver greater musical impact to the Metro Detroit region. The four chamber orchestra venues feature a split orchestra – some orchestra members perform at Orchestra Hall with various Pops or Jazz Series artists, while other musicians play chamber concerts in the western and northern communities. These concerts also allow the DSO to expand its programming, providing opportunities to explore new repertoire and to work with up-and-coming or less well-known artists without the pressures of booking in Orchestra Hall. Regularly seeing sold-out crowds at these neighborhood venues, small groups of DSO musicians have supplemented these performances with appearances at schools, hospitals, senior living facilities, places of worship, parks, and other community gathering spaces. These civic performances are offered as optional work to DSO musicians under the umbrella of the Community and Learning Department; around 75% of the players

participate in this smaller ensemble work. One-third of the participating musicians are very active and elect to have a formal contractual commitment for these services, while the remaining performers are engaged on an ad-hoc basis, committing to anywhere from one to ten services each season.

These additional performance opportunities fuel community engagement on multiple fronts. Community members at each of these appearances usually find a personal connection to the orchestra musicians who choose to participate. These personal connections are critical to developing authentic relationships throughout the community. Musicians and staff have the chance to listen to and learn from the individuals whom the DSO serves. These offsite concerts also provide ways for the DSO musicians to be better informed about the greater Detroit community through performances in places that are both closer to lapsed audience members and that are more accessible than Midtown Detroit. Yet the challenge with providing

this type of engagement within the community is balancing how to adequately serve community needs while providing the best performance and acoustic environment that will allow musicians to showcase the richness of their artistry. For example, a coffeehouse series might be a great idea, but having a space that is ten feet from an espresso machine diminishes the artistic capabilities of the musicians providing the service. In contrast, a hospital lobby might be an excellent listening environment, yet the presence of music (or any additional sounds) could disturb the patrons and patients within the hospital. From an

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organizational point of view, the DSO committed to broadening its perspective on what makes a great concert experience.

Changing the Culture from Within

While many new initiatives were creatively designed throughout the six-month time period, members of the entire DSO fundamentally agreed that they never wanted to experience the work stoppage again and that a new model of governance and management was needed. Anne Parsons, in partnership with outgoing Board Chair Stanley Frankel, initiated two task forces that new Board Chair Phillip Fisher implemented. One was a Culture and Governance Task Force, which would forge a definition of an organizational culture in relation to the DSO's values, mission, and vision. The second was the Recapitalization Task Force, which was charged with developing a long-term financial plan that would create a blueprint for balanced operations.

The Culture and Governance Task Force identified three objectives in support of the long-term health and viability of the organization:

1. Understand and define the DSO culture and determine what the culture should be in relationship to its values, vision, and strategy.
2. Identify steps the DSO can take in moving from the current culture to a preferred culture.
3. Clarify how the board can best function in support of this cultural change, with specific recommendations regarding governance practices (role clarity, communications, decision making, composition, assessment, etc.).

Led by John McCann, president of the consulting firm Partners in Performance, the Culture and Governance Task Force hosted a series of introductory sessions before initiating the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) survey to understand and filter the current organizational culture dimensions (**Appendix 2**). DSO's internal stakeholders—board

members, governing members, musicians, and staff—were asked to identify the current culture and their preferred culture. 40% participated, demonstrating the range of ways the internal stakeholders viewed the current culture (**Appendix 3**). Respondents were quite candid in describing the conditions at the DSO at the time. The ratio of negative to positive comments was approximately 8:1, and respondents commonly used words such as “dysfunctional,” “contentious,” “divided,” and “unstable” to describe the state of affairs. While delivering the bad news, John also pointed out the good news that all held similar views of where the DSO should be going.

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As painful as these findings were, the various DSO constituents also showed a strong unifying preference for how they envisioned their preferred culture and contributed thoughtful responses for how the culture could be improved. The responses were summarized into four main categories:

1. *communication*: listening, honesty and transparency, cross-constituent;
2. *engagement*: greater frequency, relationship building, intentional, purposeful design;
3. *respect*: valuing each person's point of view, empathy, creating a shared context;
4. *clarity around purpose and goals*: clear and unambiguous vision statement, alignment of programs with priorities, measuring and communicating progress.

The Task Force then led the transition work from the current to the “preferred” culture phase by identifying a set of steps in response to three questions:

1. What does the DSO see going on that it should support and facilitate more of?
2. What might the DSO do that would advance the organization toward the preferred culture?
3. What should the DSO abandon because it no longer serves the organization in helpful ways?

The Task Force's response to the three questions were distilled into broad categories of action steps (**Appendix 4**) that guided subsequent meetings, discussions, and planning around changing the DSO's culture. One way of including the entire DSO in this culture change were luncheons hosted by Phillip and Anne. Hosting six to seven lunches each week, the small group gatherings included a mixed yet balanced representation of musicians and staff. Every musician and staff member within the DSO were participants. With these encounters, Phillip aimed to create a new culture of openness and transparency throughout the organization and invited cross-constituent stakeholders into the room together to talk about their feelings and opinions of the DSO's culture. While many of the lunch participants were initially skeptical about these meetings, they soon

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began to see and understand that Phillip's desire to foster these conversations was driven by a genuine love for the organization and a positive outlook towards the future. Phillip, Anne, and John were clearly seeing commonalities throughout these conversations: while different stakeholder groups might be visibly acting differently, their collective personal values were all pointing towards a similar shared vision for the DSO's future. This vision became known as the oneDSO family.

Since the strike settlement still resulted in annual operating deficits, the DSO had to find a solution to close the fiscal gap. The Recapitalization Task Force began its work to develop a long-term financial plan that provided a documented pathway to achieve balanced operations. Comprising 21 individuals drawn from the board, staff, and musician constituencies, the Recapitalization Task Force broke into six working groups to examine financial planning models, expenses, revenues, reserves, and alternative scenarios. Throughout the 2011-2012 season, the full 21-member group met monthly for six months and the working groups met collectively on at least 22 occasions. These meetings produced no fewer than 20 different iterations of modeling earned revenues, expenses, and contributed revenues.

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Early on, the Recapitalization Task Force faced a philosophical choice: should finances be planned with "baseline" thinking or with a "mission-minded" model? The former approach would be conservative in nature but elicited a 95% confidence level in achieving a baseline plan, while the latter would aggressively pursue DSO aspirations at a higher level of risk. When comparing projected outcomes of these two approaches, the baseline model was forecast to earn \$3 million more than the mission-minded model over a ten-year period. Despite the projected revenue gap, the Recapitalization Task Force was in unanimous agreement about pursuing the mission-minded model. It allowed for growth in pursuit of organizational ambitions, which could in turn drive annual and endowment giving. The group asserted that the "DSO must continue to be an innovative and progressive institution, attracting and retaining musicians and staff of the highest caliber, and deeply

committed to serving its patrons and the broader community through music and music education.” Musicians genuinely appreciated hearing board and administrative leaders firmly upholding their commitment to the DSO artistry, especially when there was an opportunity to curtail it.

With this consensus in the Recapitalization Task Force, more than 20 financial modeling scenarios were reduced to five. The first four scenarios (**Appendix 5**) were inadequate in various ways, and each resulted in significant accumulated deficits over the ten-year period. The “What If?” vision – scenario number five – was grounded in the committee’s vision and philosophy and was the guiding principle towards creatively achieving balanced budgets on or before 2023. The “What If” philosophies led to projections nested in overarching goals:

- Build and maintain an impactful audience size.
 - ♦ Grow total annual earned income to \$10.6 million, a return to results achieved prior to 2008 by doubling the Classical subscribing household base.
- Nurture a robust, realistic and sustainable level of annual giving.
 - ♦ Grow fundraising to \$14 million annually by 2023 through doubling the size of the individual donor base.
- Prioritize the investment in people.
 - ♦ Manage expenses across the operation to an annual growth rate of 2.3%, including (a) indirect concert costs held to 0.8% annual growth per year; (b) direct concert costs held to 1.7% annual growth per year; and (c) investment in people held to all-in orchestra and staff costs growing 3.0% and 2.4% per year, respectively.

The “What If?” model still resulted in an accumulated deficit of nearly \$50 million over the ten-year period, yet it projected that a balanced budget could be achievable. This would only occur with (1) an additional \$21 million of interim (or “Bridge”) funding, initially with

high levels that declined to elimination over the ten-year period, and (2) an ambitious new endowment of \$200 million, \$125 million of which would be collected by 2023. The plan further established aggressive targets in rebuilding ticket sales and fundraising targets while tightly managing expense growth. This plan was formally introduced in November 2012 in a document titled “Blueprint 2023: The Pathway to the DSO’s Future.” After many meetings, discussions, and a unanimous approval of the “What If?” model, the Recapitalization Task Force’s work finished in December 2012, and the DSO began implementation of the Blueprint 2023 campaign.

Continued Learning Throughout the Evolving Journey

After holding to the Blueprint 2023 model’s financial plans for nearly one full year, DSO administration found that ticket sales were up, annual fundraising was strong, and costs were held at bay according to plan. While the original Blueprint 2023 laid out seemingly realistic projections, there was no comparable history on which to forecast. Additionally, with no unrestricted endowment and a limited line of credit, the DSO had an immediate need for cash liquidity. Evaluations and revisions were needed for the continued success of the plan. By August 2013, Blueprint 2023 “version 1.1” was articulated, refining the initial assumptions, projections, and financial plans (**Appendix 6**).

With each of the plan’s new initiatives, CEO Anne Parsons made a commitment to invest in each for at least five years; it was her belief that only with adequate time would an initiative have the opportunity to be tested, tweaked, and adequately assessed to inform future directions and decisions. For example, the successful launch of *Live from Orchestra Hall* webcasts spurred subsequent creative broadcasting initiatives. DSO Replay, a \$50/yearly subscription series that provides access to all previously recorded *Live from Orchestra Hall* videos, was introduced in 2014 (**Appendix 7**).

CEO Anne Parsons believed that only with adequate time would an initiative have the opportunity to be tested, tweaked, and adequately assessed to inform future directions and decisions.

The *Live from Orchestra Hall Classroom Edition* series incorporates broadcasts from the DSO educational concerts, combining music education teaching materials with DSO performances streamed into classrooms for schools that cannot physically transport their students to Orchestra Hall. While traveling, Anne hosts “DSO watch-parties” with friends of the symphony and donors. The *Live from Orchestra Hall* webcasts are also picked up on local television and streamed in

local hospitals through a dedicated DSO channel. A new partnership is also in the works with the Detroit Community Technology Project, a local nonprofit offering broadband internet for neighborhoods below poverty level where major internet providers do not offer service. 34% of Detroit residents live at or below the poverty level, and the DSO’s developing partnership aims to provide access to *Live from Orchestra Hall* and the DSO Replay on-demand videos. In addition to the public, livestream broadcasts and DSO Replay have benefited composers and artists, allowing each the opportunity to share their performances with prospective managers and ensembles.

In the meantime, the goal of the new ticket pricing scheme and the patron-centered philosophy has been rebuilding the Classical audience. The Classical paid capacity rebounded to 70% when the orchestra performed 50 concerts, though dipped to just above 60% when the concert number increased to 58 performances. Through analysis of Classical ticket sales in Orchestra Hall and the Neighborhood Concert Series, the administration developed an overall goal of paid concert capacity at 77% (**Appendix 8**). Variable pricing is still used for Pops, Jazz, and DSO Presents

concerts, as the patrons of those performances attend primarily for entertainment reasons; 35% of the subscribers donated to the DSO’s annual fund. The Classical and Neighborhood Concerts, however, have held firm at the four pricing levels, as the primary ticket-sales objective is to build the lifetime value of all patrons, especially the Classical purchasers who are more likely to make future contributions to the DSO. At the present time, 45% of the Classical subscribers donate to the DSO, and more than 93% of the DSO’s 7,300 donors contribute less than \$2,500 per year; just 25 donors account for almost 58% of the DSO’s annual fundraising. The narrative for ticket-buyers and donors alike begins with the accessibility of the DSO. Along with Orchestra Hall concerts, the DSO’s accessibility – inclusive of webcasts, Neighborhood Concerts, community concerts (four free concerts every fall in Detroit and surrounding cities), ticket-pricing schemes, or other types of creative and unique experiences (e.g. sensory-friendly rehearsals) and partnerships (e.g. bringing leader-dogs-in-training and their trainers to concerts) – fuels the patron stewardship and development among ticket sales, subscribing, and donating.

Amid all of the new initiatives, the DSO’s leadership upholds its commitment to artistic excellence. The orchestra returned to touring with a two-concert engagement at Carnegie Hall in 2013, a two-week Florida tour in 2014, and a three-week tour of Asia in 2017, marking its first international performance in 16 years, a first visit to Japan in 19 years, and debut performances in China. While these tours were not initially identified in the Blueprint financial goals, the DSO maintained its financial discipline and fully funded the projects before proceeding with any of them. The orchestra also replaced 39 new musicians and numerous staff members, attracting top talent both on and off the stage. Additionally, the DSO ratified a Social Progress Initiative in 2017, an effort to leverage the power of music to improve the lives of the citizens of Detroit and an evaluation of DSO programs on the basis of inclusion, enrichment, and expression.

The organization remains committed to prioritizing resources into existing and new programs that will serve the critical needs of the community.

In addition to the orchestra's social impact initiatives and concerts is the programming occurring in the complex adjoining Orchestra Hall. The DSO opened the Max M. Fisher Music Center in 2003 and includes The Music Box (a 450-seat hall with variable configurations) and the Jacob Bernard Pincus Music Education Center (which supports the DSO's Civic Youth Ensembles, among other educational activities). The center also provides additional performance, backstage, administrative, and rental spaces. The opening of "The Max" contributed to the redevelopment spark on Woodward Avenue; new commercial, residential, educational, and cultural facilities continue to open at a pace unmatched in Detroit's history. The Music Box was reimagined and renamed in 2016 as the Peter D. and Julie F. Cumming Cube in honor of their \$10 million cumulative giving to the DSO. Under the leadership of Detroit native Chris Harrington, "The Cube" – an acronym for *curated, urban, boundless experiences* – redefined the orchestra's commitment to innovative artistic programming that aims to bring in diverse audiences.

The Cube can be viewed as a laboratory that continues to grow and evolve. During the relaunched 2015-2016 season, The Cube presented seven shows; by the close of the 2018-2019 season, it will have presented 50 shows. These events offer a wide range of programming. The *Uncorked* series pairs wine and music with discussion by sommeliers and musicians, while *Om @ The Max* features yoga accompanied by live music. The Cube also hosts *Salsa Dancing*, *Samba Nights*, HipHop and R&B concerts by local artists, and *Conversations at The Cube*, which are moderated conversations hosted by DJ and music journalist Chris Campbell.

The Cube aims to create unexpected experiences, specifically targeting those who have not previously

engaged with the DSO. Nearly every event at The Cube is hosted in partnership with another local organization, ranging from local dance and yoga studios to food trucks and breweries. The Cube aims to connect with every sector of the Detroit community by presenting authentic experiences on stage.

Chris Harrington also oversees the Paradise Jazz Series, a throwback to Orchestra Hall's ten-year history as the Paradise Theater, through the presentation of celebrated jazz artists of today. He also manages the Art at the Max series, showcasing Detroit-based visual artists through curated art exhibits in The Max's William Davidson Atrium and creating opportunities for Orchestra Hall patrons to engage with pre-concert artist talks. While under the purview of DSO presentations, Chris's work is largely separate from the orchestra's Classical Series concerts.

All of these artistic and administrative successes have occurred as the DSO leadership has achieved its mission-minded financial goals. As of 2019, the organization has produced six consecutive years of balanced operating budgets, increased concert attendance and ticket sales, grown the annual fund, and controlled expenses. The comprehensive oneDSO Campaign raised \$93 million, including \$39 million for the endowment. The DSO's real estate assets were successfully leveraged as well. The organization sold the Orchestra Place office building and other real estate to eliminate debt, fund needed facility maintenance, and significantly de-risk the DSO's defined benefit pension plans. In stark contrast to the labor dispute of the past, the two most recent collective bargaining agreements were settled six to seven months ahead of the deadline without the administrative team's lawyers in the room.

Artistic and administrative successes have occurred as the DSO leadership has achieved its mission-minded financial goals.

John McCann revisited the DSO in 2015, three years after Partners in Performance had facilitated the launch of the DSO's Culture and Governance Task Force. He was asked to follow up to see how the organization fared in its commitment to changing its culture. Whereas stakeholders described the DSO in dismal terms in 2012, McCann re-surveyed orchestra constituents and found more encouraging "culture words," such as "ambitious," "innovative," "open," "improving," "diverse," and "passionate." While there was other evidence that the DSO showed progress, there were five key areas identified for how to leverage continued growth and commitment to a healthy organizational culture (**Appendix 9**). From every level throughout the organization, the DSO realized that culture is not a revolution but rather an evolution that is crucial to practice, develop, and uphold every day.

Planning for the Future

Ensuring the evolution of the orchestra is CEO Anne Parsons, who has been described as a lightning bolt of energy, passion, and leadership for the

DSO. Her resilient and positive leadership style has continued to attract and inspire creative professionals at all levels of the organization. Vision, excellence, and service to community are all paramount in the DSO's decision-making processes, yet through transparent and collaborative planning processes, the organization

recognizes that artistic success cannot be achieved without financial stability. Current Board Chair Mark Davidoff and Chairman Emeritus Phillip Fisher both share their commitment of stewardship and responsibility to ensure that the DSO, in Davidoff's words, "does the right thing at the right moment with the right opportunity."

The DSO realized that culture is not a revolution but rather an evolution that is crucial to practice, develop, and uphold every day.

The initial Blueprint 2023 framework helped stabilize the institution and establish a base of operations to launch continued growth. While many of the benchmarks were met, others have not yet been realized. As the DSO strives for financial sustainability, senior management is aware of the challenges that still lie ahead and the opportunities outlined in **Appendix 9**. At this point, senior leaders are taking note of some changes relative to the Blueprint 2023's original goals and projections:

- **Programs and initiatives:** The DSO embarked on several initiatives and partnerships that were not envisioned in the Blueprint, which are now part of ongoing operations
- **Earned Revenue:** Concert revenue and other earned income are growing but have not met the aggressive targets set out in Blueprint 2023.
- **Labor Agreements:** New orchestra and stagehand contracts have been reached since Blueprint 2023 was introduced. While the total cost of these contracts was within the Blueprint framework, there were variances in the individual costs of wages and benefits.
- **Spending:** Strict control over expenses, while necessary, limits the DSO's ability to take artistic and programmatic risks and can lead to staff burnout and turnover as more work is being done by the same number of employees.
- **Real Estate and Pension:** Substantial liabilities were eliminated with the sale of Orchestra Place and subsequent pension annuitization. While the building sale also reduced annual cash flow by \$600,000, the pension annuitization significantly reduced the DSO's annual funding requirement (\$1.8 million prior to annuitization).
- **Cash needs:** Blueprint 2023 did not fully consider cash needs outside of regular operations, specifically capital investment, debt repayment, and the establishment of reserves to weather monthly cash flow fluctuations. The pressure for liquidity continues to impact fundraising priorities, distracting from the longer cultivation needed for endowment fundraising.

- Endowment: Aggressive fundraising and collection targets have not been met, in part because the oneDSO Campaign has been under-resourced, but also because short-term cash needs distract from endowment fundraising.
- Music Director: Leonard Slatkin was elevated to Music Director Laureate in 2017, and the DSO is currently in a search for the new music director.

The DSO's reconstituted Recapitalization Task Force is charged with creating a Blueprint 2023 "version 2.0." In preparing this plan to present to the Board of Directors, examine the following questions through the lens of the various DSO constituencies: Anne Parsons, administrative leadership, board leadership, and musicians:

- What are the factors to assess throughout the past five years? What should be prioritized from the past and what does that indicate for the next five years' priorities?
- What is most influential in the DSO's decision-making process?
- How will each constituency ensure that it will (1) uphold its commitment to a healthy, evolving culture; (2) prioritize artistic success; and (3) adhere to fiscal responsibilities?
- Given that a significant opportunity to ideate was during the six-month work stoppage, how should the DSO continue to invest time and resources for continued creativity and ongoing innovations in the absence of a formal hiatus?
- Ultimately, how could success be defined for the DSO in the next five years? How do you articulate those priorities in the next planning document – Blueprint 2023 "version 2.0"?

APPENDIX I

A Digital Future for the DSO: Three-Year Roadmap Presentation December 9, 2010

RECOMMENDED “MUST-HAVES”



- Video Infrastructure**
- 6 HD Cameras
 - Capture & editing equipment
 - Storage



- Online Experience**
- Video/audio content
 - Email marketing
 - Website Updates
 - Mobile/SMS



- Lobby Screens**
- 5-55" screens
 - Sponsorship opportunities
 - Intermission features



- DSOVision**
- Device for enhanced performance experience
 - Sponsorship opportunities




- Tessitura**
- Customer & development database




- Print@Home Tickets**
- Simplifies online purchase process
 - Better customer experience
 - Sponsorship opportunities




- Digital Albums**
- 23 downloadable performances
 - Creates library of content
 - Sponsorship & revenue opportunities



- Hospital Broadcasts**
- Unique market
 - Creates library of video performance content
 - Sponsorship & re-distribution opportunities.




3-YEAR ROADMAP.




APPENDIX 2

OCAI: Competing Values Framework



APPENDIX 3

Culture and Governance Task Force OCAI Current and Preferred Culture Graph (2012)



APPENDIX 4

Culture and Governance Task Force Current to Preferred Phase: Guiding Principles (2012)

Overall

1. Develop a very concise statement of vision, values, and mission (possibly by reconvening the strategic planning committee which developed the current set).

Cross-Constituent and Interpersonal Engagement

1. Appoint more cross-constituent Task Forces (such as the recently created Recapitalization Task Force).
2. Schedule events specifically designed for camaraderie building.
3. Develop of a set of organizational 'guidelines' for how people at the DSO are expected to treat one another.
4. Be more inclusive—across constituencies—in inviting DSO folks to events and activities.
5. Experiment with a 'shadowing' initiative so people can learn first-hand about the realities and work of other constituents.

Communications and Transparency

1. Renew the emphasis to communicate current realities across the organization in clear and transparent ways.
2. Advance the 'dashboard' approach as a device for increasing transparency and shared awareness of current realities, progress, etc. (A dashboard is a tool, often interactive, used to display information, frequently illustrating progress toward objectives or comparing outcomes to forecasts.)
3. Lessen the emphasis on 'blindness' and emphasize more 'peripheral appreciation', within each constituency.
4. Experiment with 'town hall' type meetings as a means to encourage cross-organizational dialogue and understanding.
5. Stop airing grievances publicly, by focusing more on developing productive internal problem-solving skills and processes.

Leadership Behavior and Leadership Development

1. Adopt a more pro-active vs. reactive orientation toward challenges and opportunities.
2. Advance toward less autocratic leadership behavior.
3. Adopt the newly evolving criteria for incoming board members.
4. Restructure (shake up) the design of board meetings---making them more satisfying for participants, and as a means for greater engagement across the Board.
5. Implement a professional development program focusing on the skills required to continue building a healthy and preferred culture.

APPENDIX 5

Planning Scenarios Transcribed from November 14, 2012 presentation: *A Pathway to Recapitalization*

1. “The Genesis Model”

- Projections developed by work groups in isolation
- Assumed growth in concerts from 50 classical in 2014 to 58 in 2023, resulting in a 39% increase in earned income
- Built regular domestic and international touring into core operation
- Planned for annual fund growth of 15%, growing to \$15.03 million by FY23
- Grew the orchestra and staff complement / headcount by 12%, with annual compensation increases of 2.5%, and growth in the number of weeks of orchestra employment from 36 to 38
- RESULT: (\$97,960,000) in accumulated deficits
 - ♦ Under this first model, the budget *never* balanced
 - ♦ Annual deficits ranged from \$6-11 million, averaging \$9.8 million

2. “The Collaborative Model”

- Like the previous model, this model provided for growth in the orchestra in terms of complement, annual pay increases, and additional weeks of work. In this refinement, staff experienced no change in complement and received 2.5% increases every other year
- Efficiencies were found by expense and earned income work groups collaborating
- This model treated all touring on a pay-as-you-go basis
- It also flattened the growth curve of certain performance expenses
- Took a more aggressive approach to earned revenues, resulting in a 59% increase in earned income over the 10-year period – returning to FY06 levels
- RESULT: (\$73,430,000) in accumulated deficits
 - ♦ Under this refined model, the budget also *never* balanced
 - ♦ Annual deficits ranged from \$6-9 million, averaging \$7.34 million

3. “The Collaborative Model with New Endowment”

- Assumed the programs and offerings in the preceding, second iteration plan
- Modeled the 10-year impact of a \$125 million endowment campaign with \$102.5 million paid in by 2023
- RESULT: (\$44,330,000) in accumulated deficits
 - ♦ Budgets *never* balance by year 2023
 - ♦ Annual deficits ranged between \$5-7 million, averaging \$4.43 million
- LEARNING: a large recapitalization of endowment, alone, is not sufficient to achieve an aspirational, full-growth “mission-minded” model

4. “Downsizing Scenario”


- Cut the orchestra to 70 musicians and cut the staff from 67 to 55 FTE by eliminating \$500,000 in costs by downgrading top 4 positions from “C” level to “VP” or “director” level
- 28 weeks of concerts
- Results in an average annual budget of \$25.2 million
- Conduct a smaller endowment campaign of \$35-50 million, with \$35 million paid
- RESULT: (\$34, 390,000) in accumulated deficits
- Annual deficits average \$3.9 million
- Reduction in activities and personnel has a corresponding and negative impact on revenues
- LEARNING: substantial cuts to programming, staff, and orchestra never result in balanced budgets
- *No vision to inspire investment*

APPENDIX 6

Blueprint 2023: The Pathway to the DSO’s Future
An Updated Report to the Directors // August 1, 2013

Blueprint 2023: Income Model

Initially, “interim funding” will be required to balance the budget; by 2023, the DSO budget balances as a result of earned, annually contributed funds, and earnings from endowment



FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY 11/14/2012

Blueprint 2023: Model

Detroit Symphony Orchestra RECAPITALIZATION TASK FORCE Summary (\$ millions)	Model										FY13 to FY23		What if Version 3.7
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Growth	CAGR	
Income													
Earned	\$8.04	\$8.17	\$8.38	\$8.56	\$9.25	\$9.45	\$9.81	\$10.13	\$10.32	\$10.60	+44.5%	+3.7%	
Annual Fund	12.32	12.00	12.16	12.42	12.65	12.77	13.02	13.35	13.68	13.99	+7.4%	+0.7%	
Big Event (i.e. Kid Rock)	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50			
Interim Funding	4.20	4.35	3.65	3.00	2.10	1.80	1.15	1.00	0.30	-	n/a	n/a	
Draw on New Endowment	0.13	0.55	1.25	2.07	2.83	3.53	4.21	4.85	5.42	5.92	n/a	n/a	
Draw on Existing Endowment	\$2.4	\$2.4	\$2.3	\$2.2	\$2.1	\$2.0	\$1.9	\$1.8	\$1.7	\$3.8	+101.8%	+7.3%	
Total Income	27.58	\$27.94	28.24	28.79	29.38	30.02	30.56	31.60	31.88	34.75	+32.1%	+2.8%	
Expenses													
Music & Concerts	17.55	17.90	18.06	18.29	18.70	19.24	19.48	20.07	20.37	20.79	+24.8%	+2.2%	
Education & Program Support	9.98	10.00	10.15	10.43	10.68	10.75	11.07	11.36	11.48	11.84	+22.8%	+2.1%	
Total Expenses	27.53	27.91	28.21	28.72	29.38	29.98	30.55	31.44	31.85	32.63	+27.9%	+2.3%	
Excess (Deficit)	\$ 0.04	\$ 0.03	\$ 0.03	\$ 0.07	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.04	\$ 0.01	\$ 0.17	\$ 0.03	\$ 2.12	+10692%	+1069.2%	
Endowment Campaign Proceeds	\$15.0	\$20.0	\$14.0	\$14.5	\$14.5	\$12.5	\$12.5	\$10.0	\$7.0	\$5.0	Total	\$125.0	

CAGR = compound annual growth rate

FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY 11/14/2012

APPENDIX 7

DSO Replay Review Presentation September 5, 2018




2017-2018


Currently, DSO Replay has 387 videos available, including full-length works, Educational Concert Series concerts, and artist interviews

- Last year (July-June), DSO Replay had views of **47,815**
- DSO Replay currently has roughly **6,000 households** eligible for access
 - Most of the audience centered in Michigan
 - Most popular video was Beethoven Violin Concerto with Hilary Hahn (2,442)
 - ECS "Musical Heroes" was #4 with 771 views (includes views from DSO Classroom (public & outside DSO Replay))
- Live audience for webcasts was **360,546**
 - 75% Facebook Live, 25% dso.org and Livestream.com, averaging about 8,500 per Classical webcast
 - Classrooms were **119,000 of the total**
- YouTube channel videos had **2.04 million views**
 - Most popular video was Beethoven Violin Concerto with Hilary Hahn (1.05M)











Information is only for viewers using dso.org/live or livestream.com – excludes Facebook Live






Information is only for viewers using dso.org/live or [livestream.com](https://www.facebook.com/dso.org/live) – excludes Facebook Live






DSO YouTube Views by State - 2017-2018 - Top 15





APPENDIX 8


Detroit Symphony Orchestra 2015-2016 Ticket Pricing Presentation


November 2-14, 2016



















Blueprint 2023



APPENDIX 9

Selected slide and information from:
Organization Culture Initiative Presentation // Fall 2015

Preferred and Current Culture 2012 & 2015



Evidence the DSO is building a healthy culture:

- Increased engagement across the organization
 - ♦ A huge change in the relationship of musicians and administration ... respectful and appreciative of one another.
 - ♦ I see every day that people care about the others around them. A genuine caring for their colleagues.
 - ♦ There are now events for everyone!
- Community-minded orientation
 - ♦ The DSO has six new neighborhood concert venues.
 - ♦ The people working at the concerts are friendlier than before.
 - ♦ Our programming has something for all ages, and our orchestra is viewed in the community as outstanding.

- New leadership practice
 - ♦ People are encouraged to take action, work together, and be responsive to each other.
 - ♦ Management is far more open and transparent than it was when the first survey came out.
 - ♦ Leadership promotes an atmosphere which is accepting and considerate.

Moving Forward: Areas of Leverage

- Increase transparency
 - ♦ Respondents reflect a deep desire to understand how decisions are made, break down silos, and develop a shared consciousness in support of a commonly shared long-term purpose.
- Achieve financial health
 - ♦ Whether it's a chicken or egg situation (does a strong culture help achieve financial stability, or does financial stability contribute to a healthy culture?), is a debate probably worth having; however, informants feel that a stronger financial base is an essential goal for the DSO.
- Increase diversity
 - ♦ The desire to reach more young people, involve Detroit's broad ethnicities, and in general be 'less stuffy' were identified as important priorities that can contribute to achieving a healthy and effective DSO culture.
- Recruit, retain, recognize, and reward
 - ♦ The priority placed on the human resources function, the management of human capital, is consistent with the DSO's declared focus: first on people, then on place, and then on purpose.
- Build connectivity across the enterprise
 - ♦ This priority validates continuing much of what has been initiated over the past three years in pursuit of the 'oneDSO' culture. While one interpretation could simply be to continue more of the same, there seems to be an earnest calling for meaningful engagement – and assuring that everyone associated with the DSO is connected in ways that truly matter.



EASTMAN
SCHOOL OF MUSIC

UNIVERSITY *of* ROCHESTER