We might envy the beginning student of Schenkerian analysis, embarking toward first discovery of Schenker's revelatory musical insights—even partial glimpses of which by now have dramatically transformed the musical worldviews of so many. The student enters into a rich and fascinating landscape, to be sure, and benefits by the prior exploration of some extraordinary musical minds. Still, there are those who would sympathize with the neophyte's plight, and with good reason. For all the value of the journey and all the welcome illumination of certain landmarks along the way, its purpose and destination often reside in shadows, and the paths taken by previous explorers have not always been clearly marked.

Some appreciable stakes attach to one's successful navigation in the Schenkerian world: not only are a number of Schenkerian terms and concepts by now fundamental in the canon of music-theoretic and broader musical thought and discourse, but within music theory circles one's facility in assimilating and applying Schenker's method may well be regarded (if tacitly) as an index of her/his intrinsic musicality. Allen Forte and Steven Gilbert evince the latter attitude in the introduction to their Schenker textbook: "For the person with good musical intuitions the study of Schenkerian analysis will provide new insights and, if properly carried out, offers no counter-intuitive obstacles." Their discussion of the requirements for Schenker study emphasizes "patient study, the development of a good ear, and musical intelligence." Such rhetoric does not originate here, of course; Forte and Gilbert proffer common Schenkerian currency in their invocations of

such venerated and vague qualities as "a good ear," "musical intuitions," and "musical intelligence."²

If the above phrases are found lacking as guides to first-week students' pedagogical and intellectual orientation, their utility—to the instructor—may become clearer as the course progresses. For often, far too often, these have been the phrases and ideas recalled in response to students' (and critics') substantive questions about particular readings of musical works: why this note and not that, this harmonic prolongation and not another? Our answers often appeal to "musical intuition": "You don't really hear it that way, do you?" With the latter classic response (and its variants), not only is adherence to a particular "hearing" taken as an index of one's "musical intelligence," but the complex and problematical notion of "hearing" in its Schenkerian sense is taken as transparent and unmediated.³

Indeed, the typical class in Schenkerian analysis has been described by H. Lee Riggins and Gregory Proctor as consisting of "a series of analytical performances by the instructor to be imitated by the students; they are to copy the behaviors they have witnessed and apply them to other pieces."⁴ Hence, Schenker by rote.⁵ In the preface to their

²My use of quotation marks with these terms is not so much to question the existence of the attributes to which they refer (assuming that "musical intuition" is more or less synonymous with "musical intelligence") as to question their usage and clear meaning in the contexts cited here and below.

³Our most frequent uses of the word are, of course, metaphoric. In Schenkerian and other musical discourse "hearing," like "ear," carries multilayered meaning, its connotations usually relating much more to the complex and abstract cognition of music than to its sensory perception.


⁵I concur with Riggins and Proctor's characterization here and with their exhortation "that the rules be explained before the game begins" (ibid., 4). On other points of "A Schenker Pedagogy," I am not always in agreement.
recent Schenker text, David Neumeyer and Susan Tepping similarly criticize Forte and Gilbert for a mode and order of presentation that too often present the student with "apparently arbitrary readings which depend on middleground or background features from a complete analysis which is not presented until later in the book (if at all)." That one is expected to read and to make (foreground to middleground) analyses in line with unknown Schenkerian principles is indeed a source of frustration and confusion for students using Forte and Gilbert, as well as for others whose instructors do not use this text but proceed in similar fashion.

In fact, students approaching Schenkerian analysis for the first time may well encounter some measure of confusion, frustration, ostensive arbitrariness, and general mystification. The historical, intellectual, and cultural factors accruing to this state of affairs are many and complex, and I shall not attempt to give them due account here. Salient among these, however, are Schenker's apparent internal analytic and theoretic inconsistencies, within the body of his life's work, individual works, and even individual analyses. There is also Schenker's

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6 This is not to suggest that they are exclusively critical of Forte and Gilbert, however; in fact, most of their references to the Forte and Gilbert text recommend to the reader certain passages and chapters for illumination of key concepts.

7 A Guide to Schenkerian Analysis (henceforth AGSA), vi. One might speculate that the history of Schenkerism and its formerly embattled position has something to do with such a presentational strategy, and that this strategy is at least informed by (if not a reaction to) common criticisms of the approach on grounds of reductionism, including specifically: 1) that Schenkerian analyses are inordinately occupied with the background, whereas listening deals mainly with the foreground; and 2) that the Ursatz is a tendentious confection of the analyst bearing little or no connection with either the composer's work or the listener's experience of it. In the following statement, Forte and Gilbert's response to such charges is at least implicit: "Of these [structural levels], the one most commonly associated with Schenker is that which often seemed to concern him least: namely, the background" (Introduction to Schenkerian Analysis, 131). It is interesting and perhaps ironic that the priority given to foreground analysis in Forte and Gilbert may have countered (etic) charges of reductionism from the critics of the Ursatz, while it is at the heart of Neumeyer and Tepping's (emic) criticism of Forte and Gilbert's approach as reductive.
organicist (and elitist) ideological orientation, which exercises significant influence even now over Schenkerian practice, and which may explain at least partially some of our present-day positions: a resistance to perceived mechanization of the analytic process is congruous with the organicist binary opposition of the organic and mechanical; tendencies to mystification may echo the organicist valorization of concealed phenomena. There are important issues bound up with academic as well as national politics and polemics, and with the history of initial embattlement and eventual acceptance of Schenkerism in the American academy. Against a complex backdrop of such factors have arisen multiple practices of Schenkerian analysis and pedagogy in the American academy, among which two streams of thought emerge in recent literature as prominent and mutually opposing.

The first of these might be characterized as a position of “analysis-first.” Its most vigorous and eloquent spokesperson in recent discourse is William Rothstein, who exhorts a Schenker pedagogy emphasizing the development primarily of insight into and understanding of musical works, rather than of theoretical tenets. Following the approach of his teacher Ernst Oster, Rothstein maintains that theory should follow and be motivated by analysis, and thus in his pedagogy, “Only after a good deal of analytical practice are theoretical generalizations stated in abstract form.” Rothstein cautions against brandishing theoretic prescriptions as analytic preconceptions, which can blind us to what is actually present in a piece and lead to analyses that fail to illuminate our

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8I have written elsewhere on the attributes of Schenker’s musical organicism and what I view as its attendant ideological dispositions, one of which is the opposition of organic and mechanical, another the valorization of concealed phenomena. See my “Schenker’s Organicism,” Theory and Practice 16 (1991):143-62.

hearing, performing, and thinking about the music. He advocates devoting considerable class time to debating the merits of alternate readings, to discussing primarily "their relative plausibility as models of the composition being analyzed," and less importantly their conformance with theory. We might note a correspondence between Rothstein's pedagogy and Forte and Gilbert's, in that both present analytic practice before theoretic principles.¹⁰ A practical correlative of the analysis-first approach, we might also note, is that students' work begins at the foreground, as does the shaping of their analytic perspectives.

Such an approach is certainly admirable when it insists on the primacy of music and analysis over abstract theory, and stands vigilant against the procrustean imposition of theoretic models onto musical works. But in practice it may leave something to be desired; it can reproduce the "Schenker by rote"¹¹ scenario criticized by Riggins and Proctor and hence a mystification that has been criticized more generally. There is a frequent perception of Schenkerian analysis as mystical, magical, and even arbitrary, as David Beach has candidly acknowledged; he lays the blame at least partly with Schenkerians, to the extent that we fail to explain and justify our analytic choices.¹² Surely the more thorough explanation that Beach advocates (and subsequently exemplifies) is an important step in the right direction, but still it may fall short of the mark if offered in isolation from Schenker's theoretic models, including his background paradigms (as I shall argue below).

¹⁰ This is not to presume or to suggest any broader similarity between the two approaches.

¹¹ These are the terms in which I have characterized it; Riggins and Proctor use other language.

It is here, with presentation of background (and prebackground) paradigms, that Neumeyer and Tepping begin, in an introduction section that briefly glosses a number of other basic constructs as well. Thus, A Guide to Schenkerian Analysis, like Riggins and Proctor's "A Schenker Pedagogy," exemplifies a position that might be characterized as "theory-first." In a crucial and defining move, Schenker's process of composing-out is offered as the rationale for Neumeyer and Tepping's approach, which they call "generative" as opposed to "reductive": both in the order of presentation of concepts in their book and, hence, in the analytic perspective that students are led to internalize, Neumeyer and Tepping proceed from the background and early middleground levels "out" to the details of the foreground. Their preface includes a strategic citation of "Schenker's own insistence on analysis as re-tracing the path of the composing-out process"; surely they were aware of prior battles on this front.

This order of presentation of Schenkerian concepts has been criticized by Rothstein, again with particular reference to its manifestation in Riggins and Proctor's pedagogy. Rothstein condemns the presentation of what he characterizes as "an abstract theory, into which pieces are subsequently 'plugged in'," and asks, "Why should the student be interested in doing that?" The question is a valid and important one; undeniably a theory-first pedagogy requires of students some investment of time and energy—of blind faith, perhaps—before it pays off in substantive musical benefits. Fortunately, the investment required here is minimal: Neumeyer and Tepping confine their preparatory presentations to an introduction comprising a mere five pages,

13 Again, this is not to presume or to suggest any broader similarity between the two approaches.

14 AGSA, vi.

in which key terms, concepts, and philosophical premises are defined within a quick but revealing profile of Schenkerian theory and analysis. Theoretical premises then continue to appear at points throughout the text, usually just before they are needed for (and illustrated in) analytic applications.

Neumeyer and Tepping's preface explicitly acknowledges the potential problem of excessive abstractness in the early stages. Their proposed solution is the bass-line sketch, a pedagogical device that is intended to smooth the student's transition into Schenkerian analysis of complete musical textures. Thus, part I of the book, comprising over one-third of the text, focuses on analysis of the bass alone, in text examples as well as student exercises. This approach proves helpful in several respects. Principally, it gets students off and running in the practice of Schenkerian analysis, and does so without the usual disorientation: dealing with only the bass makes beginning study much more manageable in terms of both quantity (of parts) and quality (as the authors note, upper parts are normally much more complex). It also introduces students to notational symbols and to the hierarchizing thought processes that are constantly invoked in Schenkerian analysis.

But the analytic process introduced here is markedly (and avowedly) different from that used later for upper voices. One might infer this from the authors' claim, at the outset of chapter 1, that the bass "can be organized and interpreted for the most part according to the harmonic functions familiar to all trained musicians."\(^{16}\) Proceeding from this statement (which points out another proposed advantage of the bass-line sketch), the presentation of bass analysis emphasizes the structural role of the "harmonic cycle," identifying common techniques and formulas for its expansion, and matching particular basses with the relevant paradigms.

\(^{16}\)AGSA, 6. A similar statement is made on page 76: "patterns [in the bass] generally coincide with functional hierarchies."
Chapter 2 presents four brief analysis narratives, following a four-step summary of the method for sketching a bass line. Beethoven and Brahms narratives demonstrate the application of the four-step method and highlight some questions of formal design, respectively. Two Debussy narratives reflect the authors' interest in the bass-line sketch as a useful analytic apparatus in its own right (rather than a mere preliminary to further analysis), particularly for music of the seventeenth through early eighteenth, and late nineteenth through early twentieth centuries. They also foreshadow tendencies, revealed more fully in chapter 9, "Analysis of Music before Bach and after Brahms," to embrace repertories beyond the boundaries of orthodox Schenkerian practice, and to advocate a rather flexible analytic methodology that is adjusted according to the particular requirements of the music at hand.\footnote{Students are also advised to give careful justification of their methods, either by referring to an established model or by defining their own unique procedures (see AGSA, 113).}

Part I closes with chapter 3, comprising an annotated list of common instrumental forms and the bass patterns typically manifested in them. The motivating premise here is that identification of formal design is a principal means of determining hierarchic structure for a bass-line sketch. Teachers and students should take note: this is the most abstract stretch of reading in the book. Thus, in the interest of "grounding," one might wish to spend time on all four exercises linked with this chapter (each of which, as elsewhere throughout the text, is listed immediately following the relevant reading), and perhaps even to supplement them with examples of one's own choosing.

Part II begins with a summary of linear motion:

A tone moves to any other in one of three ways: by step, by leap, or obliquely. From these derive the three main methods of linear motion (in bass or
upper parts): lines, arpeggiations, and stationary or recurrent tones. All other melodic motions are combinations or specialized variations of these three.18

This passage illustrates a characteristic feature of the text: it identifies the defining attributes of key concepts and processes and "cuts to the chase" in clear, simple explanations and directives. Among these are several point-by-point summaries of analytic techniques, including a five-step method for analyzing structural motion in upper voices (which appears shortly after the passage just quoted).19 Such codification is an enterprise toward which Schenkerians have often turned a jaundiced eye; the analytic process traditionally has been deemed, in Carl Schachter's words, "ultimately resistant to rigorous formulation."20

Perhaps Neumeyer and Tepping would be inclined to agree with this view, first appearances notwithstanding, for clearly they have reckoned with difficulties in formulating their systematic methods. Between the opposing exigencies of rigor on the one hand and resistance on the other, the authors forge something of a compromise: they offer rigorous formulations of analytic methodology, which must be (and

18 AGSA, 62.

19 The first such summary was mentioned above: a four-step method for making a bass-line sketch. Three later examples are a five-stage process for creating a complete set of graphs (p. 68), a six-point list of priorities for interpreting upper-voice motion (pp. 76-77), and a five-point summary of circumstances appropriate to the use of the unfolding symbol (pp. 91-95).

20 A larger extract from the source passage is this: "[I]t is far from my intention to offer a 'method for the reading of diminutions' or, God help us, a 'theory of reduction'. . . . [U]nderstanding of detail begins with an intuitive grasp of large structure . . . a process that is ultimately resistant to rigorous formulation." See Schachter, "Either/or," in Schenker Studies, ed. Hedi Siegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 166-67. Further elaboration of this position is found in Rothstein's seminal essay "The Americanization of Heinrich Schenker," In Theory Only 9/1 (1986): 5-17.
scrupulously are) accompanied by qualifications for their application. Hence, the five-step method for upper-voice analysis is presented as “a very informal introduction” that is admittedly “not especially valuable apart from the chapters that follow it.”21 These subsequent chapters present full-texture analyses that reconcile the five-step method with “Schenkerian concepts and notation”22—and the authors are careful to distinguish between the two.

Amidst all the avowed limitations (and others unaccounted for), these formalized methods, summaries, and rules of thumb still have much to offer the beginning student of Schenkerian analysis. If one allows for some flexibility in their usage and some adjustments between initial and later, more broadly informed applications,23 they can provide valuable perspective on and priorities for analysis, and are of considerable help in demystifying the analytic process. The overall method is intended to provide a tool accessible to musicians of “normal training,” so that they (especially performers) might benefit from Schenkerian insights and ideas without having to undertake the “years of practice” often cited as requisite for Schenker study.24 These are worthy and rather widely-held goals, and the authors provide a path to them that is well-laid; those who share these goals may well like this book. It may not be liked, of course, by some readers who hold to a more orthodox Schenkerian practice, as this discussion has already suggested.

21AGSA, v.

22Ibid., 62.

23For instance, analysis of the bass is first presented primarily in relation to harmonic function, but the student’s perspective should incorporate more linear possibilities once she/he learns the method for analyzing upper voices.

24The authors allow, however, that it does require years of practice “to think and speak like a Schenkerian, to fashion intricate discussions of motivic and contrapuntal patterns in a composition” (AGSA, v).
The text as a whole seems rather abbreviated, at points—such as chapter 9, on pre-Bach and post-Brahms analysis—like an outline for further study. This quality allows for a greater variety of customized uses, however, and the excellent recommendations for further reading suggest a number of possibilities for expanding on the treatment of topics in the text. One might, for example, pursue issues of motivic design beyond their introduction in chapter 7 (an essay on a Chopin prelude); the chapter establishes a context for understanding motivic repetition within Schenkerian practice—its importance to Schenker, its (nonprimary) status as an analytic criterion—that can lead the reader readily into important articles on the subject. Following chapter 9, one might delve into the recommended literature to flesh out pre-Bach study, post-Brahms study, or both; another possibility is to omit this chapter altogether in favor of a deeper pursuit of more conventional practice. In any case, the authors themselves advise that it is possible but not especially desirable to use the manual independently, and they are right; it is much more valuable when used in combination with other sources.

The authors project a refreshing sense of responsibility toward student-readers, and explain musical and analytic features generally on the spot, where they arise, and often from a precise practical perspective. At times, however, confusion may arise from errors or shortcomings in editing and production, including some unclear wordings, a handful of wrong notes in score examples, a large number of typographical errors, and consistently bad type spacing. Less confusing than distracting are the computer-set scores, which often display strange and ugly beams, crescendi and decrescendi, and especially slurs. The labeling system for in-text examples and end-of-section student-exercise scores is poorly conceived and forces one to distinguish between, for instance, references to examples 1.7 and 1.7; the former is

25Example 1.7 illogically follows example 1.8, presumably for reasons of space.
found on page 11, giving measures 1-6 of a Chopin G-minor Mazurka, whereas the latter is found on page 58, giving the complete score for a Chopin B-minor Prelude. Readers who succeed in locating the pivotal difference in upper serifs here—distinguishing Arabic from Roman numerals, and hence text from exercise examples—may yet have to locate a pair of reading glasses! The best aspect of the book’s production is its physical format, a sidelong arrangement of standard-size 11" x 8\(\frac{1}{2}\)" pages, with soft covers and spiral binding.

A notable attribute of the text is its unprecedented consciousness and candor toward ideological content in Schenker’s work, which throughout is discussed in its particularity of historical situation and cultural context.\(^{26}\) This represents a welcome development for the causes of pedagogical and intellectual responsibility and clarity. And it is a direction that one hopes to see pursued still further, in texts like this and elsewhere, to address the crucial and fundamental questions of value and meaning in Schenkerian analysis; here they are at least alluded to, but still ultimately eluded. It is ironic that, although by now our community seems to be in general agreement as to the worth and importance of Schenkerian analysis, and although many of us devote a great deal of energy to doing it, writing about it, and teaching it, we frequently appear to beg the crucial question of just what it constitutes.

Most of us believe that the object of Schenkerian study and analysis is, as Rothstein observes, “to understand master-

\(^{26}\)Two passages from chapter 9 may serve as examples: “Schenker was by no means reticent about expressing a patronizing pity for the still unperfected music of composers before Bach.” And: “Schenker held a view of music history which limits true musicianship to mostly Germanic composers from Bach to Brahms (Chopin is the one notable exception)” (AGSA, 112). I run the risk of distorting such statements by removing them from their context, however: they do originate, of course, within a book whose very purpose is the promulgation of Schenker’s ideas on music.
pieces \(sic\) better\);\(^{27}\) but one finds much less clarity as to the form that such understanding might take. Neumeyer and Tepping are uncharacteristically circumspect \textit{vis-à-vis} the meaning and object of analysis. At one point they seem to exhort that "complete analytic interpretations . . . must go beyond technique to consider artistic, stylistic, or aesthetic problems" (while acknowledging that their manual deliberately does not pursue these). But their next clause reveals that they do not claim this agenda as their own; rather, complete analytic interpretations must go beyond merely technical matters "since to Schenker, the reason for analysis is the searching-out and grasping of the inner spirit or the inner life of a musical composition, both technically and artistically."\(^{28}\) Related statements are similarly held at arm's length: that "[Schenker's method] was developed in order to reveal the secrets of organic coherence in the works of, primarily, Viennese masters of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries" becomes a statement of historical fact, rather than one of purpose; and, in the introduction's analytic proto-narrative, the claim that "the deepest compositional task is to carry this \(^5\) by step down to . . . its 'rest' in the fundamental, as it were"\(^{29}\) again seems to echo Schenker's voice, rather than representing that of the authors.

Schenker himself was unabashedly outspoken on issues of value and meaning in his approach, but few (if any) American Schenkerians today would claim to embrace all of Schenker's ideas on what he was doing and why. Selective retention of certain ideas is usual, however—as in implicit or explicit definitions of the Schenkerian analytic process as a

\(^{27}\) "Americanization of Schenker Pedagogy," 298. It can be difficult to quote from the Schenkerian literature without turning up instances of "masterpiece" and "masterwork"; they are male-gendered terms that commonly appear without explanation or acknowledgment, but I do not intend to perpetuate such unexamined usage here.

\(^{28}\) \textit{AGSA}, v.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., 1-2.
natural "discovery," in the relative absence of a priori agendas, of a musical "masterwork" and its inherent "mysteries." Of course, if one looks to analysis for a gradual, unassuming disclosure of hidden musical secrets, then the theory-first approaches of Neumeyer-Tepping, Riggins-Proctor, and others must be seen as utter reversals of analytic logic, which obliterate students' fundamental motivation for learning. One might glean (from often elliptical clues) that Schenkerians evince dissenting opinions as to the purpose and meaning of analysis—when they take any position at all. A failure to interrogate adequately these and other essential matters promises grievous consequences for the discipline and for our students; we do not advocate Schenker's explanations, nor do we offer something to supplant them.30

Another article of Schenkerian custom that affects our students is the belief that thorough study in the agreed-upon prerequisite disciplines—harmony, figured bass, and counterpoint—combined with sensitive reflection will lead the genuinely intuitive musician (presumably, as with Schenker's

30 Joseph Dubiel's review of Forte and Gilbert (The Musical Quarterly 70 [1984]: 274-75) reveals that these issues have been raised previously under similar circumstances. And further, it provides an admirable concise example of the sort of explanation that I am calling for, addressing ontology and hermeneutics in Schenkerian analysis. Dubiel finds Forte and Gilbert lacking in their elucidation of "the central Schenkerian concept," which he expounds—citing Babbitt's 1952 review of Salzer, Structural Hearing—in the following terms: "a Schenkerian analyst relates a musical composition, through the panoply of structural levels, to a background for all practical purposes dictated by the theory . . . in order to show what is involved in hearing the piece as the highly ramified realization of a simple impulse . . . . In the effort to present the theory step by step, this phenomenon [of perceiving the piece as a single, simple impulse] goes practically unmentioned for chapter after chapter." Crucial distinctions of language and conception are drawn in Dubiel's continuation: "Nor is the point quite made by something deceptively similar that is said fairly often, namely that the surface represents what is beneath. Beneath the surface there is nothing but the apparatus of a complex ascription that the trained listener makes: the surface is interpreted as though it elaborated something, and the levels represent this interpretation."
composer of genius, the proof is in the pudding)\textsuperscript{31} inevitably toward a Schenkerian reading of the work at hand (albeit one perhaps in need of refinements). But how near a Schenkerian a result can we expect from even the most sensitive and intuitive musician, if he/she is performing analysis in singular innocence of Schenker’s models and techniques? Even granting our ideal musician the most thorough knowledge of harmony and voice-leading, what is to prevent her/him from “discovering” upward lines, as Schenker sometimes did in his early analyses?\textsuperscript{32} Most Schenkerians would probably acquiesce to axioms by the time that deep-level graphing is expected, but, as Neumeyer and Tepping suggest, analysis need not be focused on the background to depend on knowledge of background concepts; and still, I have known of teachers who treat even such notions as the (orthodox Schenkerian) location of structural $\natural$ over $V$ as musically transparent—denying the necessity of any abstract principle for this determination.

In truth, even the simplest prolongation is a complex abstraction: it represents prolongation not of a note or chord, but of the function with which a note or chord is invested within a constructed signifying system.\textsuperscript{33} If we are going to

\textsuperscript{31}That is to say, for Schenker, the proof of true genius is in the composition; and here, the proof of true musical intuition/sensitivity/intelligence is in the analysis. There is an apparent suggestion here (as with Schenker himself) that the genius will find the way—that is, of course, the right way—no matter the context or obstacles. This is another aspect of present-day Schenkerian thought that resonates with Schenker’s essentially nineteenth-century ideology; see particularly the disposition of “artist as unconscious genius” in my “Schenker’s Organicism.”

\textsuperscript{32}See, for example, Der Tonwille.

\textsuperscript{33}Hence, not of a note or chord, but, in the tonal system, of a degree or harmony. I am grateful to Andrew Mead for sharing with me his definition of prolongation, which I paraphrase here. It strikes me as a further commentary on the tendencies toward vagueness and mystification that the most lucid representation I have encountered of this crucial concept of Schenker’s comes from a scholar-musician outside the Schenkerian community (who is, of course, a twelve-tone theorist and composer).
inquire whether our students are "hearing" such things, then we should be clear—first with ourselves, and henceforth with them—as to what we mean by "hearing"; for, in fact, we are asking them for analytic representations that contravene one's literal hearing of the music. Addressing matters of vagueness and mystification in the classroom is not only a matter of justifying individual analytic choices; first and foremost, we must clarify our fundamental analytic assumptions and agenda—after which particular choices will correspondingly fall in line.

We are witnessing a time in which growing numbers of American Schenkerians are questioning from within the traditional assumptions of Schenkerian thought and methodology. The Notre Dame conference held earlier this year entitled "Critical Perspectives on Schenker: Toward a New Research Paradigm" was but one indicator, and inducer, of this thrust of inquiry. Neumeyer and Tepping's *A Guide to Schenkerian Analysis* makes a significant pedagogical contribution, in particular to efforts in this vein and to a *Zeitgeist* that holds bright promise for the further evolution of Schenkerian theory and practice.

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34 A common symptom of failure to do so in the classroom is a misapprehension of the primary analytic criterion as one of "this note is more important."