Are Three Legs Appropriate?  
Or Even Sufficient?  

by 

Henry Fogel

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For more than a century, the organizational model for American symphony orchestra leadership has been the “three-legged stool.” This model places responsibility in the hands of the music director, the executive director, and the board chairman—theoretically as equals. Author Henry Fogel opens the essay that follows by tracing the genesis and evolution of the “three-legged stool.” He then poses a series of critical questions about this traditional arrangement.

Roles for Musicians
First among these is the role of musicians (or lack thereof) in the overall direction of their orchestras. Fogel suggests that both the insularity of boards and the authority demanded by conductors have been sources of adversarial relationships. He notes that the emergence, in the 1960s, of the International Conference of Symphony and Opera Musicians (ICSOM) gave a negotiating voice to the musicians, a voice often at loggerheads with “management.”

Using several specific examples, Fogel details the relationship dynamic that exists in many orchestras, and pleads that “hostility and mistrust” cannot be healthy ways to run orchestral institutions.

Toward Healthy Institutions
Arguing that guarding “turfs” and not inviting musicians into serious roles in governance are major barriers to healthy orchestral organizations, Fogel particularly explores artistic direction as an area needing major revision in roles and responsibilities, and suggests that orchestra players could and should be significantly more involved. Overall, no one escapes Fogel’s scrutiny, and his concern for his subject is palpable.

In addition to being a knowledgeable and passionate participant in the orchestral scene, the author is quite a raconteur. His essay is laced with interesting sidebars that illustrate his points. This essay is meaty and thought provoking; we encourage your consumption.
Are Three Legs Appropriate? Or Even Sufficient?

“Three-legged stool” is a term often applied to the authority structure of the modern American symphony orchestra. The “legs” are the music director, the volunteer board leader (sometimes called chairman, sometimes president), and the executive director (sometimes called president, sometimes managing director). Although an organization chart would, in most instances, show the music director and the executive director reporting to the board, or implicitly to its chairman, the idea is that the three manage the operation in some kind of partnership. If one carries this line of thought further, I suppose that the musicians report to the music director, the staff to the executive director, and the volunteers to the chairman. In one form or another, American orchestras have run on this model, with only minor variations, for more than a century and with only a few exceptions. It is worth examining the history of this structure and its structural soundness. One needs to ask: Is this the best way to organize the leadership of a symphony orchestra? Are other approaches possible? Would they make a difference? If so, would it be a positive difference? And I would note right up front that an essay such as this one, by definition, will deal in generalizations.

Philip Hart’s wonderful study of the American orchestra and its history, Orpheus in the New World, is essential reading for understanding how the structure developed, and I have relied on it considerably. From the beginning, enlightened community leaders recognized that it was not possible to compensate an orchestra’s musicians solely from the box office. As early as 1881, Henry Higginson, founder of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, proposed a guideline that, astonishingly enough, we still use today: 50 percent of the orchestra’s income would come from ticket sales; the rest would have to be contributed in some form. Higginson, in fact, proposed the first orchestra endowment fund, $1 million, which, at a 5-percent draw (the ideal for most of today’s endowments), would pay out $50,000, which was the deficit he was projecting at that time.

Chicago, which had been the beneficiary of Theodore Thomas’s traveling orchestras beginning in 1870, became interested in having its own orchestra,
Higginson’s orchestra in Boston was something of a one-man show. There is much documentation of tension between Higginson and conductors, and it is clear from the evidence that the Boston Symphony was Higginson’s orchestra. In fact, he actually managed the BSO for a while, and then assigned one of his corporate staff members to manage it (thus assuring his continuing control, although professional observers have noted that this staffer—Charles Ellis—was not only America’s first professional orchestra manager, but a good one as well). Higginson did not actually turn the BSO over to a board of trustees until 1918.2

and lured Thomas to the city to form one in 1891. Chicago, in some ways, served as the model for today’s orchestral structure. A group of Chicago businessmen under the leadership of Dr. Charles Fay formed an orchestral association that, according to Hart, “would not be dependent on the support of any one man or offer its backers any prospect of profit.”3 Recognizing that there would be losses at startup, Fay secured 10 pledges of $5,000 per year for three years. He branched out to take smaller pledges as well, but probably did not realize at the time that the idea of a self-supporting orchestra was not realistic. There were few models in 1891. The New York Philharmonic and the New York Symphony were both in existence, but both were functioning more as cooperatives with relatively unpredictable work and compensation than as organizations offering anything approximating steady, reasonably salaried employment for musicians. Only the Boston Symphony was doing that, and it was still being subsidized and run by Higginson. The Chicago Symphony was to be the first orchestral “association” put together by the community, and to have a board that would make important decisions.

Through the first part of the 20th century, as more and more orchestras were formed, a few facts began to crystallize for orchestra supporters everywhere. The most significant was that the box office would never be able to support a symphony orchestra. As one looks at the financial statements of American orchestras for the first quarter of the century, and reads board-meeting minutes (where one senses a decrease in the tone of surprise that accompanies discussions of deficits as the realization sinks in), one sees the careful construction of the board undertaken in community after community.

It is clear that the formation of these boards was at least in part a matter of self-interest. The people who were providing or guaranteeing funds to fill the earned-income gap wished, rationally enough, to have a reasonable degree of control over the size of that gap. The gap could be widened by either out-of-
control expenses or income shortfalls due to unpopular programming, and one sees these issues popping up in discussions between board chairs and music directors throughout the first years of the century. The balance between “popular” and “serious” programming was constantly a source of discussion, and occasionally tension, between Theodore Thomas and Chicago Symphony board leaders. On the other hand, the trustees responded to Thomas’s urging to build the CSO its own home, just as Higginson responded to a similar need in Boston, and Chicago’s business leaders rallied around the cause to build Orchestra Hall in 1904.4

It can and should be said here that Henry Higginson, who held deeply the belief that citizens must give back to their communities and that successful citizens must give back more, really established the community-based concept that underlies the structure of orchestras today. Even though he initially ran a one-man operation, he eventually saw the need to broaden the base and formed a board similar to the one already in existence in Chicago. The board in Chicago, in turn, was based to some degree on the principles that Higginson had established in Boston, except that the Chicago Symphony decided to share the burden and responsibility among many from the beginning. It was surely these two orchestras that established the model of a community-based board that “owned” the organization. In these orchestras, board members set broad policies, hired the conductors, and, later on, began hiring the managers.

In 1915, the Philadelphia Orchestra engaged Arthur Judson, who was to become a seminal figure in orchestra administration, and whose career spanned 54 years of managing two of America’s great orchestras, Philadelphia and New York—for a good deal of time simultaneously. While Judson publicly spoke about the clear separation of the three “branches” of the orchestra (conductor, manager, board), and how that separation of authority was “sacrosanct,” the truth is that a look at Judson’s own career reveals the lack of clarity in that separation. Judson often “interfered” with artistic issues, frequently mediated between boards and conductors, argued with boards over managerial and fiscal issues, and, in the end, usually exerted his own influence strongly over all the other “stakeholders.”5 It is worth noting, as was the norm in those days, the absence of even the thought that the musicians might be a “branch” of the orchestra organization.

A Consideration of Power

It is, in fact, the size and enormous variety of constituencies, “stakeholders,” that must be at the core of any examination of orchestral structure. The history of orchestral structure has been shaped by power, the power that accrues to those who have wealth and/or access to wealth, and those who have achieved positions of social or corporate power. It is community “leaders” who have generally assembled orchestral boards, usually choosing people who resembled
themselves. Because the community group came together first, and then assembled the necessary professional forces (conductor, manager, musicians), more-or-less automatically the board of directors had a kind of supremacy: it came into being first, it hired the professional forces (and, by implication, could also fire them), and, of course, it had deep roots in the community.

I was present in Syracuse, New York, in 1960 and 1961 when a board of directors was assembled to form an orchestra, and so I saw (from a distance at first) the process at work. Social and corporate leaders who had borne responsibility for other major charitable undertakings in the city were brought together by a few leaders (in this case there were in particular two women, Eleanor Hancock and Carolyn Hopkins, who deeply believed that Syracuse should have a professional symphony orchestra) who galvanized the rest into meaningful action. It has always taken that leadership, whether from a Chicago business executive in 1890, or social leaders (often women married to leading businessmen or having received major inheritances) as in Syracuse, to rally other forces together to form the organizational structure.

But once an orchestra was assembled, other stakeholders began to assert themselves. It was in 1920, for instance, that the musicians of the Boston Symphony Orchestra went on strike. This was astonishing to the conservative Brahmins who ran the symphony. It was hard for them to recognize that their highly conservative, anti-union attitude wouldn't win the day, because as with many boards of that time, they only talked with one another, and with people who thought exactly as they did. When the musicians demanded the right to unionize, and the board resisted (music director Pierre Monteux was caught in the middle and, in the end, the Boston Symphony lost one of the century's greatest conductors because of this conflict), the musicians rebelled and struck. Eventually the musicians won. But the point is not to examine labor history, rather to look at structure—not as it exists on paper, but as it exists in reality. The reality of the board of trustees in Boston in the first two decades of this century was an insulated group which made all decisions without consulting the outside world. They kept financial matters secret and policies were set without input from any other constituencies, either inside the organization or in the rest of the community. That insularity may have led to this early example of a labor action as board members failed to consider views other than their own.

Simultaneously with the development of the power of the board came the European-schooled conductor with little patience for the idea of orchestras as examples of shared power. Stokowski, Koussevitzky, Szell, Reiner, and many other early- and mid-century music directors of American orchestras came from an era of the dominant maestro. This trend may have begun with the emergence of Mahler and Toscanini at the Metropolitan Opera and then at the New York Philharmonic. There were no lay boards in Europe (certainly none with any
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There is a story about this kind of insularity, probably apocryphal but nonetheless illustrative; it is a favorite of mine (and I actually kind of hope it is true). The story is that Harvey Firestone wanted to improve the image of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., and suggested to his advertising agency some kind of cultural radio program which Firestone would sponsor. The agency met with various network officials, and came back with a proposal from one of them for what would eventually become “The Voice of Firestone.” The suggested broadcast time was 3:00 p.m. every Sunday, and Firestone angrily rejected it. Slamming his hand on the table (so goes the story), he said, “Don’t you realize that everyone is playing polo at that time?” Whether or not this story is true, it does serve to illustrate the potential for insularity when a group of people of like mind and background form the policymaking body of an organization that is, to a large degree, a public trust, and an organization that has such a range of constituents.

“These conductors learned in the opera houses of Europe that the best way to exert their power was totally.”

authority), and these conductors were accustomed to the idea that everyone did what conductors told them to do! Musicians did not object to long rehearsals dragging into overtime because the maestro was not yet satisfied. The prevailing theory was that while an orchestra was a collective of professional musicians, musical results were only guaranteed if a single, dominant leader (the conductor) was given the power to weld these musicians into a unified whole. While there is, of course, some musical logic in that thinking, it is also fair to say that it is a short leap from that kind of power to employment and personnel policies that would make any modern-day human resources professional shudder. These conductors learned in the opera houses of Europe that the best way to exert their power was totally.

Imagine, then, these maestros’ reactions to coming to America and finding either trustees or managers—laymen, mind you—trying to tell them what to do, perhaps even advising them on programs. The result over time was an uneasy truce wherein the balance of power was divided among the three legs of the stool, and just how it was allocated depended to some degree on the personalities involved and how they interacted. There are plenty of examples of great conductors losing battles with boards and managements. Arthur Rodzinski comes to mind. He didn’t last long as music director of a number of orchestras, Chicago being his briefest tenure (one year). He could not or would not find a way to work within this shared power system, and the result was his consistent failure as a music director despite extraordinary musical abilities. But, on the other hand, there is plenty of evidence that Dimitri Mitropoulos may have failed in New York (despite having given many wonderful performances) because he did not exercise his powers with sufficient strength. Szell would appear to have been the model for the mid-
century music director. He unquestionably built a great orchestra in Cleveland, one that remains as his legacy today, some 30 years after his death, and he did so in part with the force of his own powerful personality, but in part by building a constructive partnership with his board and management.

The conductors who tried to bypass or eviscerate their boards rarely succeeded. Eventually, they found that the ultimate responsibility for making decisions—the legal and corporate responsibility—rests with that board. While most conductors, particularly through the 1950s, did exercise complete control over their musicians, they eventually figured out how to develop some type of give-and-take relationship with board and management. And that simply solidified the three-legged stool concept—a concept which had little role for the musicians.

If one goes back to that concept of the “stool,” one is actually led to ask a number of questions:

- Are important elements left out of the governance and policy setting of orchestras?
- Is it possible for an important artistic organization—one that must take risks—to exercise leadership in artistic direction with an evenly balanced structure, or does artistic leadership require that primacy is given to the artistic director?
- How, in today’s orchestra, with long absences of the music director, should responsibility and authority be allocated?
- Why has the basic organizational structure of American orchestras been unexamined and unchallenged for more than 100 years? And, more importantly, if change is desirable, how can it be brought about?

**Enter: Musicians**

Many of these questions, it seems to me, center in particular around the role of the musicians. While there are some examples of more cooperative approaches to running orchestras, and even a few truly or hybrid cooperative orchestras such as Louisiana and Denver, in general it is fair to say that the adversarial nature of the relationship between the musicians and the administration of orchestras (whether represented by the management or the board) is still the norm. This relationship may well go back to the kind of paternalism demonstrated by boards at the beginning of the 20th century, and may have its roots in the events leading up to the 1920 strike in Boston. I would note that the separation of musicians from the governance process is very unusual in the professional world. Faculty members have a great deal of input into the policies of the universities at which they work, and hospital administrators seek input from doctors as they make major decisions.

The adversarial relationship goes back not only to insularity and paternalism of earlier boards, but also to the total authority demanded by conductors up
until the middle of the 20th century. The idea of musicians as something other than anonymous cogs in the orchestral machinery ran counter to the attitude of the old-school maestros as well as old-school trustees.

Sir Georg Solti was, particularly in his later years, an extremely humane conductor who did not abuse players and in fact treated them warmly. His attitude was, however, typical of the kind of paternalism and authoritarianism of which I am speaking. He frequently referred to the Chicago Symphony members as “my children,” and when I was once passing on to him the reaction of some musicians to a guest conductor, his response was, “Who the bloody hell do they think they are telling you what they think of conductors?”

So it is not surprising, then, that no role of importance has developed for the musicians in the governance of orchestras. Add to this the managers—who already face a huge range of constituencies and probably wish to simplify their lives as much as possible—and it is not likely that pressure for change will come from the administrative quarter.

There are, of course, exceptions. Some orchestral organizations have either explored in the past or are currently exploring different kinds of organizational structures and behaviors. But this pattern is still not the norm, and it has almost always occurred as a result of crisis. The idea that an orchestra is a professional organization, perhaps closer in concept to a law firm than to a manufacturing plant, still has a long way to go to gain acceptance, not only from management, but from musicians as well. Many musicians are more comfortable not participating in the decision-making processes. It is, after all, easier to criticize decisions that one did not participate in making, and one can comfortably avoid the difficulties of responsibility by being on the outside. But is it healthy?

I would submit that, until the 1960s, most orchestra leaders (management or board) would not have included the musicians as “stakeholders.” Prior to the development of the International Conference of Symphony and Opera Musicians (ICSOM), and the strengthening of the role of the orchestra’s own musicians (instead of union officials) in determining the direction and outcome of negotiations, musicians were really seen as the hired help. There are many stories that illustrate the ways in which musicians were thought of and treated, and such stories are the background for some of the hostility that remains in
today’s labor-management relations. Many thoughtful people dislike the term “labor-management” when applied to symphony orchestras and their musicians, and I believe they are right in their distaste. The term does tend to put musicians in the category of laborers rather than professionals, and if we’re ever going to change that we probably should start by using different language. Even “musician-employer” relationship, which might sound clumsy at first, is less filled with stereotypes and would be preferable.

The musicians of one orchestra in a Southern state still smart when they tell the story of one of their board members stopping a musician from walking into the main public entrance of their concert hall on a performance night, violin in hand. “You aren’t supposed to come in here. This is for the public. You have a stage door in the back.” This is a true story, not one of those urban legends that get around; other board members of this organization have confirmed it for me. This story serves to symbolize how many of those in power viewed their roles and places in society, and the place of the “hired help.” While this particular form of behavior may well have been unusual, the attitude behind it was far less so, and was usually demonstrated in more subtle ways. A more important story, because it reflects institutional rather than individual behavior, concerns the New York Philharmonic in the late 1950s. Invited to perform in the Edinburgh Festival, the Philharmonic was not at that time a 52-week contracted orchestra. The deal that the Philharmonic management negotiated with the union was that each Philharmonic musician would receive a salary for the one week in Edinburgh. For the two weeks on the ocean, traveling to and from Edinburgh, each musician would receive the trip free (including meals), but no salary. This was at a time when the Philharmonic did not pay its musicians enough to live on, so they had to take on a variety of summer jobs, including teaching (and playing in the Lewisohn Stadium Symphony Orchestra) to round out their incomes. But here was a negotiation in which their own union basically forced each member to give up two weeks of the summer, and either be separated from family or pay to take family with them, for absolutely no compensation. I don’t know what you call that; I call it indentured servitude! The trip was not voluntary; if you were a member of the Philharmonic, you accepted those terms.

Stories and situations such as those in the sidebar on this page led to the change, in the early 1960s, in the way in which orchestral musicians interacted with their organizations. The formation of ICSOM and eventually the Regional Orchestra Players Association (ROPA) and the shift of power from local union presidents to member-elected orchestra committees happened quickly, and by the mid-1960s, the norm had been established: the musicians of an orchestra would, while still in the framework of a union organization and with assistance
from both the union and the conferences inside the union, determine their own contracts in direct negotiations with management.

Although orchestra administrators still talk about the importance of this shift, it doesn’t seem fully understood by those outside the profession, including board members. Board members often blame “the union” for negotiation difficulties, when, in fact, the negotiation tactics and directions are usually set by the players. Certainly there have been cases in which union leadership, at the local or national level, has galvanized and/or united an orchestra behind certain positions. But just as often, the musicians have dragged a union local kicking and screaming into a strike that the union did not want and could not easily afford. And without question, prior to the direct involvement of symphony musicians, both the threats and realities of strikes were far less frequent (though not completely unprecedented). The abilities of management to convince the local union president of financial limitations seem, in hindsight, far more developed than their abilities to convince their own musicians of those limitations.

One cannot understand the musician-employer relationship without understanding this background. Until the power shifted to the musicians acting on their own behalf, there can be no arguing with the fact that musicians were underpaid and had to accept some working conditions that most would agree were unreasonable, particularly in relationship to job security; and that they had no recourse from conductors’ abilities to schedule overtime at rehearsals or recording sessions without warning. Managers and board members would protest that they were powerless to address the problems. They were raising as much money as they could raise, there simply was no more. And, of course, they could not control conductors. No one could!

But the power did shift, and the musicians started to threaten to withhold services unless certain wage and working-condition demands were met. What is startling is how quickly the managements and boards found the solutions that they always denied were there. Fundraising, generally a private, discreet affair conducted among a few wealthy trustees, became public and aggressive throughout the 1960s and 1970s. I remember that when I went to work at the New York Philharmonic in 1978, the first development director had only recently been hired. Now the development department is the largest in most orchestra staffs, often by a significant number. It is hard to remember that as recently as 25 years ago, there was virtually no professional component to fundraising, and that this change was brought about solely by the musicians’ demands backed with the strength and unity that permitted them to threaten, credibly, to strike. Orchestras expanded their concert seasons, and undertook serious marketing and audience development, also as a result of demands for higher pay. Prior to
this power shift, the position of managements and boards had been that there was little that could be done that would enlarge the size, as well as the philanthropic generosity, of the music-loving audiences. But when pushed, these same managements found the wherewithal to present perhaps twice as many concerts in the “winter season,” and summer seasons as well, and to raise much more money.

**Power Conflicts and Organizational Trust**

It is important to understand the relationship dynamic underneath these facts. Having been told for many years—even decades—by their managements and by their own union leaders that the orchestra organizations were providing for their musician members as well as they possibly could, the musicians found that when pushed, those managements found solutions they had previously believed, or claimed to believe, were unattainable. This is crucial because it is at the root of much of the distrust that still exists today in orchestras. “They weren’t truthful with us then, so why should we believe them now?” is an often-voiced question. Managers like to think of this as “ancient history,” because the 1950s and early 1960s is a period that predates the careers of most of today’s managers. But it doesn’t necessarily predate the tenure of the musicians in our orchestras, the majority of whom either lived directly through that period or represent the immediately succeeding generation, who came into the profession hearing the stories from those who lived through it, and also studying with teachers who lived through it. Unfortunately, the truth is that when the balance of power favored managements and boards, they took full advantage of that balance.

It has been easy, therefore, for the musicians, both within their own orchestras and through the vehicles provided by the union, ICSOM, and ROPA, to remain mistrustful, and to view any attempt to bring them into positions of governance as nothing more than “co-opting” for the sake of disempowering them. There is safety and comfort for both “sides” in continuing the appearance of hostility. Despite the fact that, intellectually, it makes no sense to view hostility and mistrust as healthy ways to run an institution, there is a certain convenience for all parties, particularly in that it gives them someone to “blame” when things aren’t going the way that they want. How many times have we heard managers blame financial shortfalls on greedy unions or players, never questioning whether, in fact, the organization under their leadership is truly reaching its potential in earned and contributed income? Conversely, how many times have we heard musicians blame managements and boards for “simply not doing enough,” when by any reasonable measure of the resources of the particular community it would appear that those resources might well have reached a peak? Just because a management was wrong in 1955 when it said “there really is no more money

“Unfortunately, the truth is that when the balance of power favored managements and boards, they took full advantage of that balance.”
here to be raised,” it is not automatic that today’s management is wrong when making the same claim. Nor is it automatic that they are right. But objective analysis becomes impossible when the parties enter the discussion or exploration with completely adversarial attitudes and more determination to “win” than to examine.

Considering the history of symphony orchestra organizations in this country, it is not surprising that what has largely resulted resembles more a contest of wills than it does institutions in healthy alignment. We began the 20th century with the dominance of either boards or their leaders (such as Higginson in Boston). As the organizations grew in complexity, they needed stronger managers, and, at the same time, the strong-willed maestros came along in most of our major orchestras. The most skilled managers have been the ones who could, in fact, deal with the powerful maestro on one hand and the strong-willed board chairman on the other; often the manager was in the middle, trying to work out compromises between different parties. Then, when the orchestra musicians developed their own power—not inside the organizational structure of each orchestra, but more in opposition to it—the management again found itself in the middle.

Prior to the development of musicians’ power, managers were easily able to represent the board, particularly in labor issues. Today, managers often feel themselves to be “between” the musicians and the board, as the only ones who understand the needs, desires, and powers of both the board and the labor group. Most managers speak quite openly about having to “broker” final contract agreements, finding a line between the board’s desire to pay less and the musicians’ desire to have more. Even the use of the “labor-management” terminology, as I said earlier, helps to foster differences between parties, rather than accenting what they have in common.

Recently, I met with officials from a foundation that has been very generous to the orchestra in its community, and that also has connections to that orchestra’s board. They were considering the idea of a lead gift to a major endowment campaign, and one of the foundation officials indicated a fear that if the orchestral association became financially stable, there would automatically be a strike, as the musicians simply were likely to then make excessive demands. While, in this particular case, I don’t believe that would happen, we do have an orchestral structure that makes this kind of mistrust and lack of mutuality of interest inevitable. What we have set up is a structure in which various constituencies vie, in different ways, for power. What we have not set up are organizations that seek to empower everyone and bring all of these forces into alignment, moving forward in a way that will benefit the organization (and, at the same time, the people inside it).
With the background established, it is now appropriate to examine orchestral organizational structures more closely, and to explore whether some changes might be appropriate.

Musicians and Orchestral Governance
With a few exceptions of varying degrees, often arising out of crises, orchestras are curious organisms which omit from their inner circles of governance the approximately 70 to 100 professional musicians who are the organizations’ reasons for being. Most orchestra musicians have either token roles, or none at all, in shaping the direction of their orchestras. While, historically, the paternalistic attitudes of boards and managements may have set this tone, in recent years, orchestra musicians themselves have frequently (though not always) avoided meaningful roles. It seems, on the face of it, absurd that people who have studied the art of music, and whose lives and livelihoods depend on the direction of the orchestral organization by which they are employed, would not be seen as major institutional resources by those “in power.” And it seems equally absurd that the musicians would not demand a role of importance. But the “labor-management” dynamic has been in place for many years, and the attitudes of mutual mistrust (a mistrust of both motives and means, I might add) have grown very deep roots.

Not that many years ago, when musicians of one important Midwestern orchestra went on strike over the right to be represented on a committee that would seek the orchestra’s next music director, the board chairman stated that giving in to that request would be akin to “letting the inmates run the asylum.” (Interestingly, the strike only lasted one or two days before the board acceded to the request.) Who better than musicians would know the qualities and skills of potential music directors? Yet, the board felt such hostility toward its musicians that not only did it not see the logic of including them in this most musical of all aspects of the governance process, but its chairman actually felt comfortable publicly referring to the professionals that make up the orchestra in such a demeaning manner.

The problem is not solely one of attitudes. Not all musicians and orchestra committee members understand how to participate in a governance process. “Our advice is not taken” is a cry one hears frequently, but if one examines the facts, one usually finds that some advice is not taken some of the time. Musicians need to understand a reality that managers learned a long time ago: no one’s advice is always taken completely. The fact is that input always influences the direction of discussion, and colors the final decision, even if that decision is not in total accord with the advice. But no influence can be had if people are not involved in the process.

The idea of “team process” is frequently being fully integrated into the managements of orchestras. But one observes that, in most cases, the orchestra
musicians are not on the team. Many managements have developed cross-departmental work groups and task forces that relate to different projects, and one of the things that everyone has to get used to is not getting his or her own way all the time, or even most of the time. (I always laugh when people react with astonishment after I’ve told them that there are some pieces of music I have spent more than 10 years trying to get the Chicago Symphony Orchestra to program, and so far have failed. People ask how can that be possible? Don’t I have the power to do that?) More and more, we’ve discovered that strong institutional management and leadership is not about power. It is about sharing empowerment and about consensus shaping. But this means that one doesn’t always “win.”

This is a problem for those people who feel that sharing in the governance process means getting your way all the time, or at least most of the time. I have had people say to me, “Well, there is no point in your asking for our input if you aren’t going to follow it.” Good decisions on an institutional level should reflect the best of the collected wisdom of all who participated in the process, but they may not reflect any one individual’s thinking in total, or even in large part. If the right climate has been established, everyone adapts and supports the final decision—even if they are not in complete agreement—because they understand how the decision was reached, and they know that it is necessary for the smooth functioning of the organization. Differences are discussed, thoroughly considered, weighed without emotion, and these discussions influence decisions. In orchestras which have made strong attempts to bring the musicians into the process of governance, the largest difficulties have been over this concept of what collective decision making is all about.

There is nothing close to a consensus now, among managers or musicians, about the appropriate roles of musicians in our orchestral organizations. Serious, intelligent, well-intentioned managers and musicians disagree strongly about this issue. Unfortunately, in some of the discussions in which I have participated, people seemed more determined to hold onto positions that they held when they started than they seemed willing to seriously debate and discuss an issue with minds open to being changed. It is worth noting, however, that the subject of musician involvement is being discussed, and even experimented with, more and more frequently.

**Institutional Alignment**

I do believe that in some organizations the participants are coming to understand that they are all part of one large organization centered around a symphony...
orchestra, whereas in other organizations the various constituencies still view themselves as separate units with adversarial interests. This is most visibly true when looking at the musician-employer relationship, but can also be seen in some organizations in the relationships among the three “legs of the stool.” I have certainly known of managers who consciously minimized the flow of information to their board leadership, feeling that they (the managers) were more knowledgeable and that the more they kept the board out of their hair, the easier their lives would be. Similarly, there have certainly been struggles for control and power between managers and music directors.

It is hard to see how keeping these separate “turfs,” and excluding the professional musicians from serious roles in governance, can lead to healthy organizations. It seems evident on the face of it that involving everyone in governance in a meaningful and responsible way could only result in a more unified organizational effort, in greater institutional alignment. And the more work I do with orchestras of all sizes in America, the more I observe that lack of institutional alignment is an obstacle to progress. I know that “institutional alignment” is a favorite buzzword of organizational consultants and some foundation grant-givers. But the overuse of a term cannot be permitted to take away from its merit or value. The fact is that the various stakeholders in an organization must be in alignment if that organization is to achieve its maximum potential. In the case of orchestras, that potential can be artistic or financial (the two are inextricably intertwined anyhow), but it will surely not be fully realized as long as major misalignments exist.

I personally believe that there is no more important issue facing orchestras today. The nature of orchestras is changing faster than most of us can absorb. While some musicians may believe that there is the same potential of untapped fundraising resources that existed in the 1950s, the truth is that funding sources are far closer to being maximized, and even tapped out, than most of us want to admit. Additionally, some funding sources are pushing orchestras into change that is probably healthy, in terms of serving wider and more economically and ethnically diverse audiences. These changes are going to require a different view of the very missions of orchestras, and an examination of the job of being an orchestra musician.

I don’t think we can face these issues intelligently and with wide organizational trust if musicians, who constitute the major professional group in our organizations, and whose jobs are so affected by the outcome, are excluded from the discussion. Without such involvement, how can we expect musicians to better understand and share with staff and board people the “truth” I earlier mentioned about increasing constraints on fundraising? Generations of mutual
mistrust and even outright antagonism are going to have to be put aside, and people are going to have to come together to thoroughly reexamine the historic patterns of organizational behavior. The good news is that this is beginning to happen, both at the local level with some orchestral organizations, and at the national level with organizations such as the Symphony Orchestra Institute. I have been active in the Institute from its beginning because it was specifically addressing this issue, and starting a national dialogue on the subject of orchestral organization and governance. In some way, the national dialogue that has been started needs to be heated up. At the same time, leaders of orchestral organizations need to work inside their own organizations toward the goal of full participation on the part of all constituencies. We must, at both local and national levels, shake up conventional thinking sufficiently so as to change the fundamental concepts on which managements, boards, and musicians currently base much of their behavior.

**Factoring in Artistic Direction**

Is it possible for an important artistic organization to exercise artistic leadership with an evenly balanced structure, or does artistic leadership require that primacy be given to the artistic director? And, in today’s larger orchestras, is it possible for these factors to be in balance, given the long absences of the music director?

This is not a new subject. Many in the orchestra field have discussed it among themselves for years. But, interestingly, for the most part our orchestra organizations behave, or appear to behave, as if nothing has changed from the days when the music director was omnipresent and all-powerful. Musicians resist having anyone but the music director make artistic decisions, and then complain that music directors are not around enough to do so. Boards look for fundraising and community speaking skills in the chief executives that they hire, saying such things as, “The conductor is there to set artistic policy; we want a manager to run the business.”

The problem is, of course, that the business is the art, and the art is the business. They are not only not separate, they are inextricably intertwined. There is no fiscal decision that doesn’t affect the artistic product, and no artistic decision that lacks fiscal implications. I may get in trouble with some of my conductor friends for some of the things I am about to say, but I believe that they need saying. Is there any other business in the world that would put major institutional responsibility and authority in the hands of a person who is not a full-time and exclusive employee of that organization? Conductors give between 35 and 50 percent of their professional time to the institution that gives them a title (the rest is spent...
guest conducting, or perhaps having similar authority at a second organization), and yet it is assumed that this conductor is totally responsible for institutional direction and quality. There is an unspoken truth out there, one known by managers but only articulated when they’re fairly sure no one but another manager is listening: not all conductors have the success of their institutions as their top personal goals or priorities. They actually think even more seriously about their careers than they do their institutions.

This fact has serious implications. In many American orchestras, music directors are given total authority to engage guest conductors and artists. If anyone believes that all of these music directors welcome highly successful up-and-comers to their podiums, I have a bridge in Brooklyn I’d like to sell you. The truth is that many smaller orchestras see guest conductors who “trade” invitations with their music director. The final irony of this behavior is that when one of these music directors leaves (voluntarily or otherwise), the organization is not in a good position to choose a successor, because they haven’t seen one viable candidate. In the larger orchestras, where perhaps the music directors are at more secure stages of their careers, those music directors often exercise their prerogative based on non-musical factors as well. And even if they don’t, they are certainly not in a position to make the best choices because conductors rarely take the opportunity to see other conductors work. Think about it—conductors conduct! That’s what they do. But when they are rehearsing and performing, they are not going to someone else’s concerts. The secure music director actually does understand this, and takes advice from others (in and outside of the orchestra’s management), and works with the management in arriving at decisions. But there are many conductors who will not open themselves up to the views of others, despite their own limited pools of knowledge.

I use the above example because I think it is the most blatant and easiest about which to be specific. But it is only one example of one area in which we contractually give music directors authority and responsibility that may not square with the actual natures of their jobs. We must undertake a serious examination of the role of our music directors, and our communities’ expectations of them. Historically, it has almost been a cliché of orchestra administration that the management’s job was to be sure the music director got credit for everything good that happened artistically. What has happened is that by carrying forward behavior and responsibilities from the time when conductors were, in fact, truly in charge of the orchestras, we now have a situation where authority and responsibility are given to a degree no longer commensurate with the actual involvement of the music director in our institutions. And, to make matters worse, we have built the institution around the public figure of the music director, so that we set up certain expectations.

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I have often spoken to angry donors or potential donors who are upset that the music director doesn’t do the children’s concerts, without regard as to whether those are likely to be the best kind of children’s concerts. As orchestras take on more and more in community and education programs, we need to stop being apologetic for the fact that the music director might have nothing to do with those programs. We cannot expect music directors to be great conductors of a huge range of orchestral literature from Mozart to Boulez and everything in between, highly skilled community speakers, great fundraisers, and knowledgeable thinkers on issues of sociological importance, all while being less than full-time employees.

I am not suggesting removing the music director from the leadership role that he or she must continue to have in today’s symphony organization. But I am suggesting that it is time for a redefinition of what the job involves and what it does not—what it can be and what it cannot be. And it is time to stop pretending that it is more than it really is. It is time for a dialogue that includes musicians, trustees, managers, and conductors to reexamine the roles of all the constituencies of the orchestral organization in artistic matters. Is it not possible for management and musicians to participate in some artistic decisions, even artistic personnel decisions, instead of leaving these solely to music directors who might not be present more than half the year, and whose personal interactions with musicians might not always make then the best candidates to deal with personnel and human resource issues? Should the role of choosing guest conductors be one shared by the music director? And if so, with whom? Isn’t there a significant role for orchestra musicians in that process? It seems ironic that in the typical modern orchestra, there is virtually no responsibility and authority in the hands of the professional musicians who are there virtually year-round and probably for the rest of their professional lives, while there is excessive authority and responsibility in the hands of a half-time employee who is far more likely to leave the organization well before most musicians do.

By the way, it is equally fair to ask if managers always have the interests of the orchestral organization as their prime concern. Aren’t they also on “career paths”? Of course they are, but, in fact, music directors are generally judged by the quality of their concerts, whereas managers are judged by the successes of their orchestra organizations. Acting in the interest of the organization tends to be more in the direction of self-interest for a manager than it might be for a music director. Still, it is, of course, appropriate for the other constituencies in the organization to be certain that the manager is acting with the best interests of the organization in mind. When managers don’t perform (which, sadly, is

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more frequently than one might wish), the issue is generally not whether their
good will is misdirected. It is usually either a matter of technical competence or
a lack of the ability to lead a group of diverse people toward consensus.

Even if we assume a greater role for musicians, there are still some fundamental
questions that need to be addressed. If the central mission of our orchestras is
artistic (and I think we should continue to assume that it is, despite other
secondary missions), then should there not be one leader of the institution to
whom the artistic matters most, and who is fully and
solely employed by the organization? In the current
“three-legged stool” model, the idea is that the music
director is responsible for the artistic product, or
result. The executive director is responsible for
keeping the business going. And the board chairman
presumably oversees both, and serves as the
community’s “watchdog” over the public trust that
is the organization. One doesn’t have to feel that this
structure has failed miserably to wonder whether it
could be improved.

Could the job of artistic direction be separated from
that of the principal conductor? Isn’t there a basic
flaw in stating, publicly and internally, that the person
who bears the ultimate, final authority and
responsibility for artistic quality is a person who is
frequently absent from the city, and a person who
rarely hears the orchestra perform under any other conductor? Should we explore
the possibility of a director of artistic affairs (let’s not get hung up on the title,
that’s just an example) who might even have the power to make personnel
decisions, or at least recommendations, and who would be able to rule on a
whole range of artistic-related issues that come up through the year? Could this
be a player from the orchestra? Or could it be a directorate, made up of a group
of players? Or is there, at least, a role in these matters for musicians?

Currently, these issues are sometimes handled ineffectively or inefficiently
because the music director is not on the scene (in the largest orchestras), may
not even have a feel for the community and the institution as a whole, and
because fax, phone, and e-mail as true communications vehicles are imperfect.
One cannot give full attention to a problem from across the country or across
the ocean, and likewise one cannot implement artistic authority without a full-
time knowledge of the institution and how it works. The skills required to conduct
a great concert are not, in fact, the same skills that imply a successful manager
of artistic and personnel issues. There is hardly another profession in which
employees, whether professionals or laborers, do not receive performance
evaluations, but no conductor with whom I have ever discussed the issue has
felt willing or able to perform such appraisals of their musicians. The result? No
one ever tells a musician that he or she is doing a good job (especially if that

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Harmony: Forum of the Symphony Orchestra Institute
person is not a principal player). Only when they do something wrong are they singled out. And we wonder why we have morale issues? This is but one of a number of issues a non-conducting artistic director could take responsibility for—issues that are seldom dealt with at all today.

I recognize that the ideas and thoughts outlined above need fleshing out. This is a case, though, in which I don’t believe any one person or organization can come up with the answers. What I do think has to happen is that the issues must arise for discussion, whether at managers’ meetings at various group levels, at American Symphony Orchestra League conferences, at AFM players’ conference meetings and within the Conductors’ Guild, and among local managers and the other constituencies in their orchestras. It has been somewhat “off limits” to raise these issues in a meaningful way, certainly in public forums, and the result is that the best minds with knowledge of the field and its history have yet to seriously discuss departures from the present pattern of music directors’ control of artistic matters.

The Role of the Board, and Its Relationship with Management

As we consider orchestral structure, what do we do about the fact that the titular head of our orchestras, the one person with the on-paper authority to actually hire and fire the other two “stool legs,” is in fact the person with the fewest professional qualifications for that power? No, I am not suggesting a revolution that would disempower the board chairman. But I am suggesting that we must have a recognition that these are complex organizations that are completely different from the corporate and/or social cultures from which most of our board leaders come, and that if they are going to exercise their leadership roles competently, they need some training. The American Symphony Orchestra League has begun to put its toes in these waters, if tenderly. But much more must be done, and the field must recognize the importance of professional development programs for board leaders. Clearly, steps can be taken on the local level too, but they will require managers of conviction and strength, and board leaders willing to examine fundamental tenets that may have been held in place for decades. It all goes back to developing an internal culture where the issue is not, “Who has the power?” but instead, “How do we all work together for the organizational good?”

Even if that training were available and utilized, we still need, in my view, a national discussion on the issues of power, authority, and responsibility in the modern orchestra. It used to be said, in simpler times, that the board raises money and sets policy, the management manages, the conductor conducts, and the musicians play. I’ve heard some people today still asserting this nice bromide. But it doesn’t work. First of all, fundraising cannot be the exclusive domain of boards, although it is still a primary responsibility for them. But orchestras have large development staffs because not all fundraising is volunteer-driven, and because even that which is needs not only staff support, but staff guidance.
Someone has to set the framework for a board, help it determine appropriate goals, and address how those goals might be attained.

Where is the line between governing and managing? Is it always so clear? And even if it is, do we really want a structure that excludes the top professional managers from setting policy? Would any for-profit corporation run that way? I have worked, in some way, with the boards and managements of well over 50 American orchestras in the past 25 years, and I can say from firsthand experience that there is very great confusion over these issues on the part of many board leaders and many management professionals. Too often, boards overstep any boundaries of good managerial sense and spend hours debating with managers whether the color of the subscription brochure should be red or blue. And managers excuse their own failures in the development area by saying “my board didn’t do its job.” Neither of these situations is acceptable, and some kind of dialogue needs to come about to clarify lines of authority and responsibility.

A Look to the Future

In recent years, reports of a state of crisis in American orchestras have circulated, and they have been wrong. The fact is that American orchestras, in the aggregate, are financially as healthy as they have been at any time in history, and one can document that with any number of statistics. Work stoppages are no more frequent now than they have been at any time over the past three decades, and in fact the recent trend toward longer contracts might indicate an even healthier situation. One might then ask, why even think about change at a time when no crisis seems at hand? “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” long the rallying cry of those afraid of change, seems applicable here.

I have always looked at my own job as requiring me to catch things before they break, to prevent the breakage. Letting things break and only then fixing them seems an inefficient way to operate. Anyone who has spent time inside orchestra organizations cannot help but recognize the tensions, and the danger signs for the future. Outside pressures keep increasing for orchestras to serve wider and more diverse populations. Corporate, foundation, and government funding is getting harder to justify for organizations that seem to provide pleasure for a perceived, or real, upper class of society. And orchestras can no longer limit themselves to simply playing subscription concerts, along with a few children’s programs, in their main concert halls. This is not the place to argue the merits of these changes in direction, although I happen to believe in them. These changes are unavoidable realities, and require institutional alignment. True alignment means that all of the stakeholders believe in the same goals, recognize their roles in achieving those goals, and work toward those

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ends. It means the musicians, the music director, the staff, the board, and the volunteer organizations are all pulling in the same direction, recognizing that everyone makes contributions and has responsibilities. It doesn’t mean that there is never disagreement or even tension, but it does mean that there is general agreement on the big picture, and because of that, the tension and disagreements can be resolved, usually without pain.

Does the institutional structure exist in most orchestras that will allow for the most productive operation of the organization? I don’t believe that it does. Musicians too frequently see the management as the enemy; managers see musicians as obstacles to a smoothly running operation; board members want to know why the organization can’t earn a higher percentage of its budget, so there is less pressure for fundraising; volunteer groups feel that they have goals thrust upon them about which they had little to say; each party seems to feel that if only everyone thought as they did, things would be so much better and more efficient. Basic, fundamental questions don’t even get asked; assumptions don’t even get challenged. Is it true that the best-managed orchestra is one with the highest percentage of earned income? Many would answer “yes.” I would not. Not if that success was achieved at the expense of artistic quality and growth, perhaps by increasing successful pops concerts at the expense of more costly subscription classical concerts. This may ease the fundraising burden. But is easing the fundraising burden a mission-central objective? Not necessarily.

Does the orchestra have the right music director for the community? Is the budget level the appropriate one? Just how big should this orchestra be? How many weeks should it play? Is the current mix of rehearsals and concerts the right mix? Is the mix of classics and pops the right mix? What kinds of community programs are appropriate? Should these be a normal part of the musicians’ job descriptions, or should they be paid as extra work? Should the job definition of being an orchestra musician be reexamined, perhaps to include such other components as education, community engagement, or even fundraising?

The purpose of the list of questions in the preceding paragraph is only to provoke thought. It is not meant to be anywhere near a complete list of questions that need to be asked. The real point is: every single one is a question I have heard raised at different orchestras with which I have worked. In virtually every case, there has been a different answer from each constituency, and no appropriate organizational structure in which those questions could be studied and answered in a way that brought the constituencies together. These questions either never get answered at all, or they get answered by the constituent group that has the power to answer them, and the rest simply go along. This does not lead to true institutional alignment, and it does not lead to the most effective and efficient operation of any

“The amount of time orchestral organizations waste in dealing with frustration and anger is time that could surely be better spent.”
organization. The amount of time orchestral organizations waste in dealing with frustration and anger is time that could surely be better spent.

It is important to remember that while I am suggesting changes in organizational structure, the question of process is equally important. To put it simply, if the board and management were simply to dictate that, starting tomorrow, the structure will change and musicians will be significantly involved in board membership and in all governance issues, the results would probably be disastrous. The process of an institution arriving at a structural change, and the change itself resulting from that process, is every bit as important as the structural change itself. I have often counseled that the process of developing a long-range strategic plan for an orchestra might be more important than the plan that resulted, if that process helps to bring various constituencies together and into real alignment. What is truly needed is for orchestras, perhaps with the aid of professionals who specialize in organizational change, to develop sets of internal processes to bring about change. The success of the resultant structural shifts will be directly related to the success of the processes.

It is time for a high-level national dialogue about the way our orchestral organizations function, and it is a dialogue that cannot take place only among representatives from orchestral organizations. The orchestral field has been remarkably insular over time, with most of its professional practitioners feeling that only they truly understood the field. Outside advice has rarely been welcome, and is usually dismissed as inapplicable. In fact, specialists in organizational behavior could probably tell us a lot about the ways in which we have been operating, and could probably help us improve our institutions. Labor and management officials from the for-profit world, and administrators (along with faculty members and doctors) from the educational and medical worlds, could probably teach us a lot, if we were willing to listen. But even here we need to recognize that orchestras are more complex organizations than any of those, and thus only some of the techniques will logically transfer to our field. We would all have to put aside assumptions on which many of us have based our careers.

I know that when I speak with many of my colleagues in this field, the subjects of stress, burn-out, and angst come up with some frequency. I am sure that these elements play a role in the lives of all executives and administrators, but after lengthy conversations with major corporate CEOs who run worldwide multibillion-dollar corporations, I am convinced that the stress levels are higher in the orchestral world, and they are higher because of the lack of true institutional alignment. These stress levels do not apply simply to managers. We know from
the recent Institute study, *Stress and Job Satisfaction among Symphony Musicians*, and from other studies, that there is great room for improvement in musicians’ levels of job satisfaction. Similarly, the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, and other individual organizations, have done studies that show high stress levels or dissatisfaction among volunteers. It is time for those of us who care about orchestras to admit that perhaps we are not doing things in the best possible way, and to examine alternatives. Are we willing to open our minds to completely new practices and behaviors? I certainly hope so.

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Notes


3 Hart, *Orpheus*, p. 32.

4 Hart, *Orpheus*, pp. 40-44.


6 To show how dramatic this lack of consensus is, let me cite the following example. In recent negotiations, the musicians of the San Francisco Symphony expressed a desire that everyone in the entire organization symbolically be identified as being a part of the same team. The musicians requested that the governing and managing bodies stop referring to themselves as representing the “association” or “society” (“I’m the Chairman of the Board of the San Francisco Symphony Society.”). The musicians felt that this was a way of separating management from the musicians, and musicians from the organization. They felt that their organization would appear healthier if everyone was seen as working for or on behalf of the orchestra. Interestingly, this came after a long and painful strike. Conversely, in a negotiation at about the same time, the musicians of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra demanded that management and board officials always separate themselves from the orchestra by using the word “association” when referring to themselves or their titles, or in press announcements. So, you would have a marketing director of the San Francisco Symphony Orchestra, and a marketing director of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra *Association*. I use this example not to praise one group or approach, or criticize another, only to point out the lack of direction and unity in thinking about this issue nationally among orchestra musicians.
By the way, the other parts of the cliché are that the board chair was to get credit for all good fiscal things that happened; the manager’s role was to take the blame for all things that went wrong. When I was first told this by a successful orchestra executive when I was new in the field, my response was, “That’s dumb. How can that do anything but build a lack of confidence in the management, which can hardly be in the interests of the institution?”