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Research Issues in Orchestra Labor Relations

by

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Sometime in the last 10 years, most readers of *Harmony* have also read about protracted contract negotiations between orchestral musicians and their employers. But what do we really know about these negotiations? Not much, according to Case Western Reserve University's Everette Freeman, a professor of labor and human resource policy.

The author leads us through an explanation of the parties involved in orchestra labor relations and the concerns that each brings to the bargaining table. He then posits a series of issues which he considers ripe for further research.

The Roles of Structure and Strategy

The author then wonders aloud if issues of orchestral structure and strategy are perhaps equally or more important research topics than are behavioral or procedural concerns.

He suggests that the work of Peter M. Blau could provide a useful analytical framework and shares with readers the lines of analysis which Blau (a professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) has pursued.

Will Research Add Value?

Everette Freeman admits that he is an interested party when it comes to the survival of American symphony orchestras. While he questions whether research about orchestra labor relations alone can make a difference, he challenges readers to consider the fact that few organizations in the private sector risk their organizational fortunes to anecdotal information—an apparently all too common practice in negotiations between musicians and management.

Research Issues in Orchestra Labor Relations

In general, parties involved in a symphony orchestra's labor-management contract negotiations strive to reach a successful conclusion. Ironically, despite a mutually favorable disposition toward achieving this goal, far too many negotiators regard symphony labor-management relations as pathological. They bemoan what they see as the general dysfunction of symphony labor relations, and often charge that their counterparts across the bargaining table are malefactors—embodiments of the worst kind of policies and practices. Often, a cloud of mistrust appears to prevent parties from seeing each other as strategic partners progressing toward mutuality and joint problem-solving.

Against this backdrop of suspicion, is there any basis for believing orchestra labor relations can be viable? What conditions must be met to reverse the current perception of orchestra labor relations? Do current structural arrangements advance or frustrate labor-management cooperation? Is there a future for collective bargaining in the institutional configuration known as the American symphony? Are the parties involved too far apart for rapprochement? Which is the problem, the parties or the structure?

“... collective bargaining literature has paid scant attention to the symphony orchestra as an institutional player in American labor relations.”

The relative absence of research on current orchestra labor relations may actually heighten negotiating parties' perceptions of immobilization in a conundrum of strife and bitterness. So far, collective bargaining literature has paid scant attention to the symphony orchestra as an institutional player in American labor relations. Helpful studies exist, but either they touch the subject only tangentially, or they need updating.¹ For example, after a conference on labor relations and the performing arts cosponsored by the School of the Arts at Columbia University and Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations, a publication appeared containing an animated and thoughtful discussion that deals squarely with orchestra labor relations issues (Jeffri, 1986). However, while brimful of lively exchanges of ideas among orchestra labor relations practitioners, the work suffers from a lack of analytical detachment.

Currently, two Cornell professors, Lois Gray and Ronald Seeber, are putting the finishing touches on an updated review of labor and the performing arts. This may well prove a welcome research volume.²

As with labor relations generally, orchestra labor-management relations are in flux, not permanent and static. Despite the aforementioned perceptions to the contrary, there are signs that the field of orchestra labor relations is percolating with significant, far-reaching changes. This article aims to initiate an ongoing dialogue about orchestra collective bargaining issues, and to promote interest in orchestra labor-relations research among researchers, practitioners, foundations, and others.

Orchestra Labor Relations: The Parties and their Concerns

The parties involved in orchestra labor relations—musicians and their associations, managers and their boards, benefactors, governments, and the community—influence and are influenced by the values, needs, aims, and concerns expressed in contract-negotiation items and, to a greater or lesser degree, in the collective bargaining agreement itself. Musicians bring to the negotiation table such clear-cut bread-and-butter issues as wage parity, benefits proposals, due process provisions, and other terms and conditions of employment. They also bring a firm recognition of how their wages and other employment terms compare with those of peers elsewhere. Increasingly, most musician bargaining committees come to the table with at least a rudimentary appreciation of the fiscal challenges facing orchestras. What orchestra labor-relations research has yet to tell us is what role nonmonetary issues such as feelings of noninvolvement, lack of professional development, and lack of opportunity for input into various decision-making processes play in the formulation of monetary demands. We do not know, for example, the degree to which monetary demands are a template for other issues generally categorized as “being more involved.” Possibly, musicians would be more willing to tackle fiscal challenges facing their orchestras if their “human side,” or nonmonetary concerns, were adequately addressed. Without measures which accurately capture musicians’ sentiments across a range of monetary and nonmonetary issues, nobody exactly knows.

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Managers and board members bring to the bargaining table vexing financial dilemmas that directly and indirectly affect the state of the orchestra, including pay equity for musicians, escalating medical and insurance costs, and endow-

ment management pressures. Managers and board members are also aware that musicians no longer see themselves as performing mendicants gladly accepting financial crumbs. Increasingly, managers and boards are looking to musicians for support and guidance in expanding and extending new revenue and audience sources.

Board members also face many administrative and planning challenges that directly or indirectly shape their negotiation concerns. These challenges include juggling constantly rising fund-raising goals for capital as well as for operating funds; health care cost escalation; growing community expectations of the orchestra as a primary, central music education source; shifting musical and cultural tastes which affect both audience development and the survival of the symphony orchestra; and maintaining financial equilibrium in a storm of financial pressures.

While not usually seated at the labor negotiation table, benefactors, governments, and the community nonetheless powerfully influence labor and management. Benefactors frequently see themselves as key stakeholders in the outcome of negotiations, especially when an impasse interrupts a performing season. Not uncommonly, benefactors (especially those who are also board members) interject themselves into labor-management impasses as honest brokers to facilitate agreement. Such participation can provide assurance that management commitments will be honored. In other instances, the most finely tuned diplomatic skills come into play when well-intentioned benefactors who are not directly involved in negotiation want to aid in the process. In the future, negotiating parties may discover the utility of such honest brokers, despite the current rarity of such arrangements. Such benefactors as charitable foundations are also showing increasing interest in labor negotiation. In the not too distant future, foundations may want orchestras to demonstrate healthy and viable labor relations as a precondition for new or continued funding.

Most often, governments leave the negotiation of orchestra contracts to the principal parties. Notwithstanding this *laissez-faire* posture, governments at local, state, and federal levels, including the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), play an enabling role by providing technical expertise and, in some cases, financial support. City and state governments in particular often regard orchestras as part of their cultural capital; cities with performing orchestras frequently feature them in commercial development literature. Most political figures profess at least passing interest in the labor relations affairs of orchestras; no politician wants it said that the symphony collapsed or left town during his or her watch. Clearly, government support agencies such as the NEA have a vested interest in orchestra affairs and have prominently supplemented the budgets of many U.S. orchestras. Throughout its existence, the NEA has maintained at least a casual interest in orchestra labor-management relations developments.

The community—perhaps the most important element in the calculus of orchestra affairs—plays a central, albeit distant, role in symphony labor relations. Orchestra subscribers, friends of the orchestra, frequent and infrequent

concert-goers, contributors to community trusts such as the United Way, and citizens at large: all share a stake in the orchestra's continued survival. Ultimately, it is for the community—the audience—that musicians make music. The community also includes musicians' families and orchestra staffers, as well as others who indirectly influence orchestra labor relations by endorsing or opposing contract demands and pleas for support. In the final analysis, parties at the orchestra negotiation table are keenly sensitive to the impact of their outcome on ticket prices, season duration, loss of goodwill, and community quality-of-life issues.

“If the symphony orchestra is to survive, musicians, management, and the trustees must collaborate seriously on their *collective* future, must develop a respectful, serious, substantive dialogue rather than yell at each other from entrenched positions. They must work out a common future based on a common process (and progress) that will deal realistically with the real ‘common enemy’: those millions of people in our society—and their political representatives—in whose lives ‘classical’ music plays no part whatsoever.”

Gunther Schuller

“The State of American Orchestras”

Musings: The Musical Worlds of Gunther Schuller, 1986

Research Issues Regarding Parties and Their Concerns

Those involved in orchestra labor relations as practitioners, stakeholders, or researchers often do not know enough about intraorganizational and interorganizational dynamics, especially the shaping of issues over time, sometimes in response to criticism. While money continues to be an overarching concern for both orchestra management and musicians, there are no systematic data on, for example, the relative weight or importance parties assign to such matters as long-term fiscal planning, endowment management, strategic planning, or income maintenance. Granted, a final negotiated collective bargaining agreement may contain provisions regarding pay increases, benefits coverage, and the like, and through these, express issues important to the parties. But contract language itself cannot convey the depth or range of understanding that parties share. At best, contracts represent compromise language rather than a definitive gauge of parties' closeness or distance on a given issue. Furthermore, a contract says nothing about how a party ranked core issues or why it may have misunderstood the importance of a given issue. Research on attitudes about financial stewardship, endowment development, and other money-management-related issues could shed light on fiscal nuances of the collective bargaining process. More importantly, research could aid in understanding how shared and differing beliefs about fiscal health shape parties' viewpoints.

In another instance, no readily available data describe in detail prebargaining negotiations between management and bargaining teams of the International Conference of Symphony and Opera Musicians (ICSOM) and the Regional Orchestra Players' Association (ROPA). Nor do any studies indicate whether final settlements among orchestra bargainers are more easily obtained if some prenegotiation dialogue occurs. Orchestra musicians and their associations, executive directors of orchestras, the American Symphony Orchestra League (ASOL), and management committees share some information. Little is known, however, about information-sharing between unmatched pairs—between, say, board members of one orchestra and musicians of another. Moreover, no research explores the role of attorneys. Does their involvement chill or thaw orchestra labor negotiations?

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Another area needing greater clarification is how much real or imagined influence and/or power ICSOM, ROPA, ASOL, or the American Federation of Musicians (AFM) exercises within local bargaining situations. In the previous issue of this publication, Judy (1995) implied that there may be little justification for involvement of national players' and management associations in local contract negotiation, beyond providing technical and moral support. Whether parties share this viewpoint, or shun “expert advice” from their national associations because they themselves best understand local circumstances, is unknown. Why do some rank-and-file musicians and union-management negotiating committee members suspect that contract items are imported and dictated by ICSOM, ROPA, AFM, or ASOL? Does affiliation with national associations automatically taint local autonomy as far as contract negotiation is concerned? Systematic research might begin to answer these questions.

The role and scope of miscommunication in negotiations and its consequences on the outcome also need elaboration. Certainly anecdotal information exists about the impact of rumors and organizational grapevines, but no analytical data show if rumors help or harm labor-management relations. Similarly, in instances where parties have used the media to secure negotiating advantage, no studies assess the impacts—positive and negative—of media interaction before, during, and after contract talks.

At the level of the individual musician, both management and labor have common and divergent concerns. Among those shared are: the general health and welfare of the musician, performance quality, and the work environment. Both musicians and management of the New Jersey Symphony, for example, eagerly await the completion of A. Russell Johnson Concert Hall so that, for the first time, musicians will have decent, permanent lockers of their own (Tamburri and Swanson, 1995).

In some areas, however, management and labor differ about what musicians

want. To what extent do parties' needs assessment findings accurately mirror players' concerns? Are there instances in which parties conduct joint needs assessments? Does this approach garner more or less knowledge than existing methods of assessing player needs and concerns? How widely do parties rely on modern "electronic" communications technologies to track player concerns,

“Perhaps the least understood dimension of orchestra labor relations is how power and power relations influence the contours, content, and context of contract negotiations and contract administration.”

and how widely is this information shared among labor, management, and player associations? What is the nature of intraorganizational bargaining (Walton and McKersie, 1991) in player contract ratification? Do musicians defer to their negotiating committees, or must committees, often with management's help, sell the contract to members for approval? Again, anecdotal information surrounds these matters, but no rigorous case or empirical research studies are available.

Perhaps the least understood dimension of orchestra labor relations is how power and power relations influence the contours, content, and context of contract negotiations and contract administration. How do negotiating parties define power? How do they exercise it? Are certain power dimensions and techniques of power dominance common across orchestras where labor relations and negotiations are concerned? What are they? Do the parties at the orchestra negotiating table possess relatively equal power? Does it matter? Is power residual? Do parties regard power as a zero-sum game? In general, do parties respond consistently across orchestras to real or perceived loss of power? To wit, does the labor relationship accommodate shifting power relationships over time and, if so, do parties modify their behaviors accordingly?

Finally, precious little is known about how parties employ face-saving strategies in orchestra labor relations. Although the collective bargaining literature emphasizes the importance of face-saving in nurturing and sustaining viable labor relations (Rubin and Brown, 1975; Lewicki et al., 1993; Kramer and Messick, 1995), no systematic research tells us how face-saving operates in orchestra labor negotiations and contract administration. For example, do parties use a predictable script to signify that a loss of a contractual provision will not destroy an ongoing relationship after the contract is ratified?

Research Issues Regarding Structure and Strategy

Although research on negotiating parties' issues in orchestra labor relations is of the utmost importance, research on structure and strategy issues associated with orchestra bargaining is equally important. Indeed, a case may be made that structural or institutional issues override behavioral or procedural concerns,

“Social Structure can be conceptualized as a multidimensional space of social positions among which a population is distributed. This conception takes multigroup affiliations into account, and it also implies that opportunities for ingroup and intergroup relations depend on conditions in the social structure, for proximity in social space, just as physical proximity, makes social relations more likely.”

Peter M. Blau

Structural Contexts of Opportunities, 1994

and perhaps even dictate their nature. In this respect, it may be possible to talk about two structures: on one hand, the structure of the bureaucracy known as the symphony orchestra association, and on the other, the structure of the collective bargaining process.

Abundant information outlines how symphony orchestras are organized structurally. For example, ASOL periodically publishes information about member orchestras and their composition. What is not as well known is how the structure impedes or facilitates labor-management cooperation. Thanks to the work of Hart (1973) and others, much is known about the American symphony orchestra's historical development as an institutional form. However, the kind of work Hart began needs to be updated. There may be merit, for example, in systematically exploring the bureaucratization of orchestras. Has the increase in orchestra staffs reduced or expanded interaction between musicians and management? Has the voluntary nature of orchestra associations—that is, board members' key role in orchestra governance—changed with paid staff? Structurally, do orchestra associations rigidify over time? Under what conditions have orchestra associations radically altered their structure?

Judy (1995) argues that American orchestra organizations are unique. It is not clear, however, whether the characteristics that set orchestras apart from for-profit and other nonprofit organizations represent fundamental or surface differences. Orchestras and auto factories both possess contract bargaining committees; in this narrow respect, they are similar rather than unique. To firmly establish “uniqueness” will require considerable field research comparing orchestras with other organizations along a range of organizational dimensions (structure, values, authority lines, locus of power, and organizational ecology, to name a few).

Similarly, the degree to which executive directors of orchestras import their conductors' command structures into their day-to-day management practices merits attention. While few modern conductors would be classified as dictators, the tradition of strong, authoritarian conductors has played a role in the development of the American symphony. Reiner did not build the Chicago

Symphony Orchestra on democratic principles. Ironically, the excesses of authoritarian conductors contributed significantly to the development of orchestra unionization. Insofar as the control of administrative and other nonartistic matters usually rests not with the conductor, but with the executive or managing director, issues of leadership style, management training, and sensitivity to nuance in contemporary human resource practices also warrant study. For example, no available studies identify key success factors in orchestra management, and compare them with factors in the private sector. Simply put, there is a dearth of available information about day-to-day management issues across the orchestra spectrum. The same is true for orchestra union-related structural and administrative issues. To gain a better understanding of the latter, researchers may need to adopt as lenses of analysis paradigms from sociology, social psychology, institutional economics, and game theory.

For example, the sociological literature and work of Peter M. Blau could provide a useful analytical framework. In a very thoughtful work on the structural contexts of opportunities, Blau (1994) reminds us that organizational forms do not appear out of thin air, but are the result of historical antecedents. A professor and sociologist at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Blau has championed the study of organizational structure and of structural analysis as a method of social inquiry. His books include: *Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (1955), *Bureaucracy in Modern Society* (1956), *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (1964), *Structure of Organizations* (1971), and, with Joseph E. Schwartz, *Inequality and Heterogeneity* (1977). By emphasizing structural analysis, Blau avoids the array of psychological theorizing that may or may not prove useful to practitioners. His overreaching concern is how structures influence the people within them and their range of choices.

The “structure” of an organization refers to the way its subsystems are organized. Subsystems include divisions, departments, offices, sections, and individuals. With the exception of individuals, all subsystems are essentially suborganizations with their own roles and specific functions. They are all differentiated and yet work more or less together to achieve the organization’s goals. A formal designation of offices and statuses, the configuration of which can be depicted in an organizational chart, holds the subsystems together (Blau, 1956; Kuhn, 1975; Miller and Form, 1980). In simple terms, an organization’s history, values, technology and technological change, organizational goals, and organizational complex shape its structure. The individual certainly plays a role in shaping organizational structure, but the organization’s goals and operational context determine that role.

Take, for example, the structure of a modern U.S. symphony orchestra. One of the enduring appeals of the symphony orchestra in performances is the specter of dozens of performers responding to the conductor’s commands. In performance, the symphony orchestra is captive both to the work being performed and the interpretation and direction the conductor lends it. Except as called for in a composition, players are not free to play what they will, sit where they will,

or do what they will; they follow the dictates of the composition and conductor. In this way, the structure is essentially predetermined. Social relations between musicians, between musicians and audience, among the conductor, the union, the players' committee, the executive director, and the management staff are also shaped by the organizational structure. This is not to say that personal relationships do not exist inside and outside the orchestra. The conductor and the tuba player may be longstanding friends. But their status and roles in the symphony organization require that the tuba player follow the performance orders of the conductor even if he does not wish to.

"... collective bargaining... serves as musicians' institutional agent, through which they exercise countervailing power and gain a collective voice..."

Collective bargaining represents an institutional arrangement for controlling, to a degree, musicians' interactions with the conductor, management staff, board, and others involved in the production of their product, the music. From the perspective of organizational structure, collective bargaining is a

suborganization within the larger symphony organization. It serves as musicians' institutional agent, through which they exercise countervailing power and gain a collective voice they lack as individual organizational subordinates. Musicians do not become organizational subordinates through managerial callousness (although historically, some conductors and managers have been ruthless), but as a consequence of structural designs rooted in history and tradition. Blau would suggest that, if greater opportunities for musicians' participation in orchestra governance as equals are to occur, attention must be paid to liberating the structure from its historical anchors without tearing it apart.

For Blau, the structural context of opportunities is a theoretical construct. Blau's ideas remind us that what happens at the bargaining table results from influences—within and outside the orchestra labor relations structure—which shape parties' responses. These influences include the age and health of musicians; the degree of mutual trust between players and management; parties' previous collective bargaining experiences; the orchestra's financial state; and the pattern and extent of support from donors, subscribers, and patrons.

Judy (1995, 17) adroitly observes that symphony orchestra organizations are "homophylic": ". . . they consist of a group of people with strongly similar interests and beliefs who initiate and perpetuate an association." While it is tempting to explore the psychological dimensions of association, Blau's model implies that association is more the product of the structural context than of individual strivings or impulses.

How is Blau's thinking relevant to the field of orchestra labor relations in general, and to providing curative guidance to those involved in symphony labor relations in particular? Blau's structural framework directs attention away from personalities in labor relations. By applying Blau's conceptual model to orchestra

labor relations, the predilections of individual orchestra managers or musicians become less important in determining the contours of the relationship than structural limitations and organizational architecture.

This is not to say that individual actors do not matter. They do. But their actions are proscribed by the structure. For example, if parties facing budget shortfalls would ask how the current forecasting, financial planning, and capital development systems have failed them, rather than assigning blame to individuals, creative problem-solving could probably be achieved. Looking at how the collective bargaining structure, rather than personalities, shapes outcomes, it might be possible to systematically explore parties' entrapment in their own organizational configurations. A question worth asking is: does the current structural context of orchestra labor relations generally circumscribe opportunities for reorienting and reshaping the relationships between musicians, musicians and management, musicians and their union, and management and orchestra boards? Even if bargaining parties genuinely desire to conduct negotiations differently, can they achieve greater communication, mutual understanding, and trust without reconfiguring the bargaining structure?

***“Research is needed
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According to Blau, new organizational structures which enrich and enhance our lives are possible when we take steps to “reorient our thinking” (1994, 207). His framework reminds us that symphony orchestra organizations must be understood as structures consisting of subsystems with distinct identities, functions, and histories; subsystems which sometimes collide with other subsystems to create gridlock. Without this understanding, parties involved in collective bargaining, human resources management, strategic planning, and other core activities may develop action strategies that further heighten organizational tensions. In a word, structures matter

and parties cannot ignore them. Structures can be changed—and changed for the better; but only to the degree to which they are fully understood in the first place.

Research on orchestra negotiations and strategy has yet to emerge. While Kochan, McKersie, and Cappelli (1984), Cooke and Meyer (1990), and more recently, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, McKersie, and Walton (1995) have addressed the dynamics of strategy in the labor negotiation process, only anecdotal information exists about the nature, form, and content of orchestra labor-relations strategy. Research is needed, for example, on how external and structural constraints affect strategic choice in orchestra bargaining. How does bargaining change, for instance, in the face of a bankruptcy filing? Under such circumstances, do parties believe they have genuine strategic options? How have severe reductions in public support for the arts affected opportunities for joint strategizing by labor and management? How do parties separate their individual

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and joint bread-and-butter bargaining issues from crucial strategic bargaining issues? Does negotiating strategic issues first rather than last (or vice versa) sway issues of mutual concern, or what Walton and McKersie (1991) call “integrative bargaining” issues? What are the strategic areas of interdependency?

The terms “labor” and “management” have been used throughout this paper. In an age of increasing employee involvement, these terms may no longer capture the evolving collaborative nature of employment relationships. Indeed, it is unclear what impact these terms have on the mindsets of parties, or whether musicians consider themselves part of the American labor movement. Similarly, no research indicates if executive directors would rather be called “team leaders” or, say, “organizational effectiveness engineers.” For now, the terms “labor,” “management,” “union,” “contract,” “strike,” and “lockout” are all we have to describe the collective bargaining process. Other terms may be more effective.

Does Orchestra Labor Relations Research Add Value?

The symphony orchestra remains a powerful cultural and artistic icon in the United States. It owes its huge appeal to the many people who perform and conduct the music, manage the day-to-day affairs, provide administrative governance and financial support, and attend performances.

In terms of governance and human resource structures, the vitality and variety of symphony orchestras in this country also owe much to the institution of collective bargaining. The record of successful orchestra labor relations rests not with the researcher or policy analyst, but with the men and women who, facing each other across a bargaining table, hammer out a collective bargaining agreement. Despite the tremendous technological advances of postindustrial society, collective bargaining remains highly personalized. It is human beings, not machines, instruments, or computers, who make deals. Parties involved in orchestra labor relations are intertwined, for good or ill, in a process that is often untidy and unseemly, frustrating and exhilarating, and ultimately, theirs alone.

Of what value is orchestra labor relations research? Research is important and necessary in any field of activity. As part of the nonprofit community, American orchestras have not enjoyed the same degree of scrutiny and systematic study as for-profit organizations. This situation is rapidly changing as nonprofit organizations adopt more private-sector practices, and as erosion of government and private support forces orchestras into difficult choices. Increasingly,

managers, board members, employees, and others want useful, relevant data with which to gauge decisions. Certainly, research is preferable to guesswork.

In carrying out their mandates to provide a cost-effective product to the widest possible audience, few orchestras have the luxury of ignoring market research. On the contrary, many orchestras now regard such research as a key administrative element. Similarly, in the not too distant future, orchestras may look to labor relations research for insights into the best human resource practices, strategic planning, and organizational development. At base, labor-relations research provides a dispassionate critique of the union-management process. Research on orchestra labor-relations policies and practices may cast light on vexing paradoxes and enigmas embedded in the collective bargaining process.

A few orchestras may elect to develop in-house expertise in labor-relations research issues. Most orchestras rely on whatever information is available. ASOL, ICSOM, ROPA, and AFM will no doubt also continue to generate research, and may expand their research capabilities. Perhaps labor and management will jointly sponsor research on orchestra labor-relations issues. At the present time, however, research in orchestra labor relations holds more questions than answers. Perhaps the university community is best able to fill the void. If so, academic researchers will need greater access to union and management practitioners, records, archives, and rank-and-file staffers and union members for field as well as empirical research.

Whether research on orchestra labor relations will ultimately make a difference or add new insights is debatable. Less debatably, few leading organizations in the private sector risk their organizational fortunes on anecdotal information. If nothing else, research on orchestra labor negotiations may provide the last best hope for helping negotiating parties discover new policies, practices, and strategies, and, ultimately, achieve a shared objective: the survival of the American symphony.

Notes

¹ Michael Moskow (1969) wrote a survey of unions and negotiations covering the performing arts. His work has not been replicated and has suffered the ravages of time. Two years later, Arian (1971) devoted a chapter in his study of *The Philadelphia Orchestra* to labor-relations issues. Arian's analysis focuses entirely on Philadelphia and on financial and behavioral issues, without much reference to social-process concerns. Hart (1973) provides a cogent overview of the AFM's and, later, ICSOM's and ROPA's roles in orchestra labor relations in his magisterial study of the American orchestra. Hart's work remains the definitive study of American orchestras and their inner workings; it merits updating. Gorman (1978, 1984) touches tangentially on orchestra labor relations in his examination of the AFM's efforts to garner a share of recording-industry income for musicians. The same is true for Seltzer (1989) in his sympathetic study of the struggles of the AFM to represent its members. Neither Gorman nor Seltzer provides much in the way of labor-management comparisons.

² Since the 1960s, there have been a half dozen or so doctoral dissertations that examined orchestras. Only one of these (Lunden, 1967) looked at labor relations explicitly. Griffing's (1994) recently completed dissertation along with Jones' (1991) doctoral thesis explore aspects of orchestra human resource management usually covered by symphonic collective bargaining agreements. In other fields, including sociology, economics, and political science, there have been significant orchestra-related studies. Lehman (1995) covers these thoroughly in her symphony orchestra literature survey. Yet, despite the existence of some sources in the field, systematic studies of current orchestra labor relations as such are few.

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